Synthetic Control and Dynamic Panel Estimation: A Case Study of Iran by Gharehgozli, Orkideh
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
9-2018 
Synthetic Control and Dynamic Panel Estimation: A Case Study of 
Iran 
Orkideh Gharehgozli 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2804 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
Synthetic Control and Dynamic Panel Estimation: A Case Study of Iran
by
Orkideh Gharehgozli
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Economics in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York
2018
ii
c© 2018
Orkideh Gharehgozli
All Rights Reserved
iii
This manuscript has been read and accepted by the Graduate Faculty in Economics in
satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Professor Wim Vijverberg
Date Chair of Examining Committee
Professor Wim Vijverberg
Date Executive Officer
Professor Wim Vijverberg
Professor Partha Deb
Professor Sebastiano Manzan
Supervisory Committee
The City University of New York
iv
Abstract
Synthetic Control and Dynamic Panel Estimation: A Case Study of Iran
by
Orkideh Gharehgozli
Adviser: Professor Wim Vijverberg
International sanctions imposed on Iran, targeting primarily Iran’s key energy sector and
its ability to access the international financial system, have harmed Iran’s economic growth,
specifically from 2011 to 2014. This thesis uses this case to study and compare the appli-
cability of two different popular approaches used in comparative case studies exploring the
effect of a policy intervention.
In the Chapter 1 we study the synthetic control method. Using this method, we estimate
the effect of the intensification of sanctions on Iran’s GDP during the period 2011 to 2014.
The year of 2011 was Iran’s first full year under these heavy sanctions, and in 2015, the
Iran nuclear deal framework was established. Prior to this time, in spite of the ongoing U.S.
sanctions, Iran’s GDP had a positive trend from 1990 to 2011. However, our estimates show
that the GDP suffered a hit of more than 17 percent over the period under question. We
find that these effects were particularly severe in 2012 – the same year of the enforcement
by the European Union of an oil embargo and added financial boycotts against Iran.
In Chapter 2, we take a different approach to the same case, and incorporate a more
structural and traditional framework. We use a Difference-in-Difference model as well as a
dynamic panel data model to estimate the effect of sanctions. According to the dynamic
panel data estimation, the cumulative effect of sanctions on the country’s GDP is −11.40,
−18.12, and −18.62 percent for 2012, 2013, and 2014. In this chapter, we also compare the
synthetic control method with the dynamic panel data regression framework. First, we show
v
that the synthetic control method provides an unbiased estimator if the underlying model
of the outcome variable of interest is a dynamic panel data model. Second, we compare the
prediction power of these two methods.
In Chapter 3 we design a Monte Carlo study to discuss the performance of the methods
used in previous chapters over many replications. In this chapter, we examine the robustness
of the method. We conclude that the dynamic panel data model seems to be performing
well with the macro level aggregate data, and the assumptions are appropriate. However,
for the synthetic control method we observe large standard error in the estimated values. If
we translate that to a significance analysis, this means that even though we observe mean-
ingful values reported as the effect of the intervention, they are not statistically significantly
different from 0.
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Chapter 1
An Estimation of the Economic Cost
of Recent Sanctions on Iran Using the
Synthetic Control Method
1.1 Introduction
1 International sanctions imposed on Iran, targeting primarily Iran’s key energy sector and
its ability to access the international financial system, have harmed Iran’s economic growth,
specifically from 2011 to 2014. Using the synthetic control method, this paper estimates
that sanctions during this period reduced Iran’s real GDP by more than 17 percent with the
largest drop occurring in 2012.
Since the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, sanctions have been the main feature of the
US-Iran political relationship. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a wide range of sanctions
and trade restrictions were imposed on the Islamic Republic targeting its regional power
in the Middle East, but more recently, sanctions have been more focused on the country’s
1This chapter is partially published in the Economics Letters:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.008
1
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nuclear program. Before the late 2000s, the U.S. had kept a higher level of intervention in
Iran’s nuclear program compared to the European countries and other U.N. members. The
turning point came in 2010-2012, a period of a cooperation among the majority of these
countries and the U.S., and the imposition of more sanctions, trade restrictions, and em-
bargoes focused on the nuclear program (European Union Council Conclusion 2012, United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010).
Iran is one of the most significant countries in the oil industry worldwide. In 2014, with
157.53 billion barrels, the share of Iran’s crude oil reserve of the OPEC was 13.1 percent.
OPEC in that year held 81 percent of the global share (OPEC Statistical Bulletin, 2016).
This put Iran in third place in the OPEC ranking and fourth place on a global scale. Iran
is also one of the most important countries in the gas production industry. In 2012, Iran’s
marketed production of natural gas was 202.43 billion standard cubic meters, 26 percent of
the total OPEC production and highest among all other OPEC countries.
Using the synthetic control method, we attempt to estimate the effect of the intensifica-
tion of sanctions on Iran’s GDP during the period 2011 to 2014. 2011 was Iran’s first full year
under these heavy sanctions, and in 2015, the Iran nuclear deal framework was established,
and the Iran Deal was signed setting in motion the loosening of sanctions (JCPOA, July
2015). Prior to this time, in spite of the ongoing U.S. sanctions, Iran’s GDP had a positive
trend from 1990 to 2011. However, our estimates show that the GDP suffered a hit of more
than 17 percent over the period under question. We find that these effects were particularly
severe in 2012 – the same year of the enforcement by the European Union of an oil embargo
and added financial boycotts against Iran.
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1.2 Method and Data
In small-sample social comparative studies, where interventions affect aggregate entities such
as countries or states, it is often difficult to find suitable controls that are unaffected by the
intervention, and also have similar characteristics to those of the affected unit (Abadie et al.,
2010, Collier, 1993, Lijphart, 1971).
Instead of using a single control unit, the synthetic control method (Abadie et al., 2010,
2015, Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) uses a weighted average of a set of potential control
units to provide a synthetic control unit that more closely resembles the affected unit in
terms of predictors. Here we use the synthetic control method to construct a synthetic
control unit for Iran representing expected GDP figures under a scenario in which there had
been no sanctions after 2011. We refer to this control unit as “Synthetic Iran”.
The empirical analysis is based on annual country level panel data for the period 1980-
2014. As international sanctions were imposed in 2011, this yields a pre-intervention period
of more than 30 years. We divide our pre-sanction period to a training period from 1980 to
1994 and a validation period from 1995 to 2014 (see Abadie et al. (2015)). Our donor pool
includes eight OPEC member countries: Algeria, Ecuador, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.2 Also, in order to increase the size of the
pool, we add donors from major non-OPEC oil producer countries (i.e. Canada and China)
as well as other non-OPEC neighbors of Iran with close economic similarities (i.e. Oman,
Bahrain, and Turkey). The variables used in our analysis are listed in the data appendix
along with descriptions and data sources. The outcome variable of interest, Yjt, is the real
GDP for country j at time t. GDP is Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)-adjusted and measured
in constant 2011 international dollars. Because our donor countries are heavily dependent
2To construct the synthetic control unit, we left Venezuela and Iraq out of the donor pool due to economic
fluctuations in these countries during the period of the analysis. However, we find the result is insensitive
to this exclusion. We also left Angola out due to data limitations.
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on rents from natural resources, for the pre-sanction predictors, we rely on a standard set of
economic growth indicators for these countries.
1.3 Synthetic Iran and the Effect on GDP
1.3.1 Construction of the Synthetic Iran
Figure 1.1 plots the real GDP of Iran versus the average of the donor pool from 1995 to
2014. This period includes our validation period, 1995 to 2011, as well as the post-sanction
period, 2011 to 2014.
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Figure 1.1: Real GDP, Iran vs. the Average of the Pool.
For the entire pre-sanction period there is a noticeable difference between Iran’s GDP
and the average of the pool. As one of the wealthiest countries in the OPEC, and compared
to other countries in our pool, Iran’s GDP is above average during nearly the entire pre-
sanction period. After the sanctions, GDP drops and falls below the average of the pool.
As the graph suggests, the average does not do a good job of resembling Iran’s GDP for
the pre-sanction period. This would also be true of any of the individual donor countries.
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However, as shown in the next section, it turns out that the synthetic control can very closely
reproduce Iran’s value of GDP for a long period of time before the sanctions.
Table 1.1: GDP Analysis: Donor Pool Countries and Share of Each in the Construction of
the Synthetic Iran
County Weight Country Weight
Algeria 0.138 Nigeria 0.002
Bahrain 0.000 Oman 0.001
Canada 0.268 Qatar 0.002
China 0.027 Saudi Arabia 0.112
Ecuador 0.000 Turkey 0.194
Kuwait 0.001 UAE 0.254
Libya 0.001
Table 1.1 provides the list of the donor countries and share of each in the construction
of the Synthetic Iran 3 Iran’s counter-factual is best reproduced by a weighted average of
Canada, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and China. The share of
other countries in the pool are either zero or very small. Canada has the highest weight
followed by UAE.
Table 1.2 compares the pre-sanction fit of Synthetic Iran and a population weighted
average of the countries in the donor pool.
3If we assume X1 is a (K × 1) vector of preintervention characteristics (including different combination
of the output variable for the affected unit, and similarly X0 is the same vector of (K × J) dimension for
unaffected units, then these weights are picked to minimize the penalty term:
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ))
where V is a positive semi-definite matrix of weights on the predictors. Usually the choice of V is to minimized
the RMSPE (see Abadie et al. (2010)).
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Table 1.2: GDP Predictor Means Before the Sanctions
Predictors Iran Synth Pool
Total natural rent(% of GDP) 11.1 11.1 16.8
Agriculture(bn$) 16.6 16.8 24.8
GDP-2010(t$) 1.3 1.3 1.5
Trade(% of GDP) 32.8 36.2 54.7
Population(million) 51.2 52.4 101.5
Industry(% of GDP)-not participating 33.9 19.6 21.8
Services($)-not participating 94.2 49.9 47.2
Note: the last column is the population-weighted average of all the countries in the donor pool. All the
variables are averaged over 1995-2011. We augmented this matching with a lagged value of GDP as a
predictor. Weights on the last two predictors industry and services in the construction of the synthetic
control is zero; this explains the discrepancy between the means.
We observe that the pool average does not demonstrate similarities to Iran in terms of
pre-sanction predictors. However, the Synthetic Iran provides means much closer to the
actual Iran. Overall, Table 1.2 suggests that Synthetic Iran provides a better comparison
than the population weighted average of the pool.
1.3.2 The Effect of 2011 Sanctions
Figure 1.2 displays the paths of the real GDP of Iran and Synthetic Iran from 1995 to 2014.
Synthetic Iran closely resembles Iran’s GDP over the pre-sanction period.
Our estimate of the effect of international sanctions imposed in 2011 is the difference
between the GDP of actual Iran and the Synthetic Iran from 2011 to 2014 period. The
discrepancy between the two after 2011 suggests a large negative effect of the sanctions on
the country’s GDP.
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Figure 1.2: Real GDP: Iran vs. Synthetic Iran.
Figure 1.3, the gap plot, also depicts annually the effect of the sanctions. The gap plot
provides the exact value of the gap between the two paths shown in Figure 1.2. Both figures
show that while the GDP of Synthetic Iran grows, the GDP of actual Iran drops notably
after 2011 with the gap between the two growing in magnitude. Iran’s GDP in 2014 was
1289.9 billion dollars, which we estimate to be 271.3 billion dollars less than the value it
would have been had there been no sanctions imposed in or after 2011. This is equal to a
17.3 percent drop in GDP over the course of three years of heavy sanctions. Relative to the
Synthetic Iran benchmark, Iran’s GDP was reduced by 12.0 percent in the first year after
the sanctions.
During the post-sanction period, the rial, Iran’s currency, weakened not just against the
dollar but against all other major currencies. Also, inflation increased from 10.8 percent in
2010 to a peak of 34.7 percent in 2013 (Central Bank of Iran annual bulletin). Meanwhile, in
order to resist the intensification of sanctions, Iran has shifted the structure of its economy to
be more reliant on domestic capacities and less dependent on oil exports, which has helped to
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Figure 1.3: Annual GDP Gap Between Iran and Synthetic Iran.
diversify the country’s economy. The unemployment rate stayed constant around 10 percent
during this period (“Annual Labor Force Survey Result” provided by the Statistical Center
of Iran).
1.3.3 GDP Per Capita
We also apply the synthetic control method to look at the effect of sanctions on Iran’s per
capita GDP. We use the same donor pool with the same set of predictors, but this time
the outcome variable of interest is real GDP per capita, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)-
adjusted and measured in constant 2011 international dollars. Table 1.3 provides weights of
the donors in the construction of the synthetic Iran which fits the figures of the per capita
GDP. The implicit control unit is slightly different from the previous one and the weights
on the donor countries contributing to the construction of the synthetic unit has changed.
China is the country with the highest weight followed by Canada, Nigeria, and Libya.
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Table 1.3: GDP Per Capita Analysis: Donor Pool Countries and Share of Each in the
Construction of the Synthetic Iran
County Weight Country Weight
Algeria 0.007 Nigeria 0.098
Bahrain 0.003 Oman 0.001
Canada 0.153 Qatar 0.010
China 0.671 Saudi Arabia 0.012
Ecuador 0.000 Turkey 0.001
Kuwait 0.020 UAE 0.000
Libya 0.023
Figure 1.4 displays the corresponding synthetic control unit as well as the actual per
capita GDP. From 2011 to 2014, Iran’s population grew from 74.2 to 78.1 million inhabitants.
On the other hand, real GDP per capita dropped from 17.9 to 16.5 thousand dollars over
the same period. According to the synthetic control analysis, we estimate that in 2014, real
GDP per capita would have been $3236.80 higher if no sanctions were imposed. In other
words, real GDP per capita suffered a 16.4 percent drop over the course of three years after
sanctions.
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Figure 1.4: Real GDP Per Capita: Iran vs. Synthetic Iran.
Table 1.4 provides the match of the mean of the predictors between the synthetic Iran and
actual Iran. The population weighted average of the donor pool does not present similarities
to actual Iran. But the mean of the synthetic Iran (i.e. the weighted mean of the countries
selected to construct the synthetic control unit) is very close in the four dimensions that
participate in the selection process.
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Table 1.4: GDP Per Capita Analysis: Predictor Means Before the Sanctions
Predictors Iran Synth Pool
Total natural rent(% of GDP) 11.5 11.5 17.8
Agriculture(bn$) 16.2 16.0 24.1
GDP-2010(t$) 1.7 1.7 3.9
Trade(% of GDP) 33.4 32.9 55.0
Population(million)-not participating 50.3 74.2 100.1
Industry(% of GDP) 33.9 34.0 22.2
Services($)-not participating 94.6 19.7 45.2
Note: the last column is the population-weighted average of all the countries in the donor pool. All the
variables are averaged over 1995-2011. We augmented this matching with value of GDP in 2011, 2010,and
2009, as well as 2003 and 2000 as predictors. Weights on two predictors services and population in the
construction of the synthetic control is zero; this explains the discrepancy between the means.
1.3.4 GDP Growth
Iran’s annual GDP growth rates are positive for more than a decade before the sanctions.
However, after the sanctions of 2011, GDP growth falls to -7.44 percent in 2012 and -0.19
percent in 2013, and it rose to 4.6 percent in 2014. We run the Synthetic Control analysis
to estimate the figures of Iran’s growth of GDP for 2012, 2013, and 2014.
We use GDP growth as the outcome variable of interest this time. However, we change
the predictors variables slightly. Instead of using population we use growth in the population,
we use “agriculture” as percent of GDP instead of levels, we use “services” as percent of
GDP. The other predictors are as before. We measure the growth rate of GDP as the
annual change in the log GDP, and we use the annual growth of population which is more
appropriate compared to level of the population.
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Figure 1.5 provides the path plot of the GDP growth synthetic control analysis, and
Figure 1.6 is the corresponding gap plot for it.
Figure 1.5: Annual GDP Growth Gap Between Iran and Synthetic Iran.
Figure 1.6: Growth in Real GDP: Iran vs. synthetic Iran
The weights of the donors are provided in Table 1.5.
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Table 1.5: GDP Growth Analysis: Donor Pool Countries and Share of Each in the Construc-
tion of the Synthetic Iran
County Weight Country Weight
Algeria 0.407 Nigeria 0.039
Bahrain 0.001 Oman 0.001
Canada 0.002 Qatar 0.064
China 0.098 Saudi Arabia 0.002
Ecuador 0.090 Turkey 0.160
Kuwait 0.001 UAE 0.156
Libya 0.050
Table 1.6 provides the comparison of the mean of the predictors between Iran, synthetic
Iran, and the population weighted average of the donors.
Table 1.6: GDP Growth Analysis: Predictor Means Before the Sanctions
Predictors Iran Synth Pool
Population growth(m) 3.1 3.0 3.3
Total natural rent(% of GDP) 11.5 11.2 17.8
Trade(% of GDP) 33.4 33.7 55.0
Industry(% of GDP) 33.9 33.9 22.2
GDP growth-2010(%) 5.8 5.0 5.8
Agriculture(% of GDP)-not participating 13.4 11.0 9.0
Services(% of GDP)-not participating 52.8 38.6 21.9
Note: the last column is the population-weighted average of all the countries in the donor pool. All the
variables are averaged over 1995-2011. We augmented this matching with value of GDP in 2011 and 2010
as predictors. Weights on 2 predictors in the construction of the synthetic control is zero, this explains the
discrepancy between the means.
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GDP growth of Iran in 2012 drops to -7.44 percent. However, synthetic Iran grew by 3.92
percent. Thus, according to the synthetic Iran the growth is -11.36 percent lower than what
it would have been if there had been no sanctions. In 2013, the actual growth suffers a
drop of -0.19, while according to the synthetic Iran, the growth would have been positive 3.8
percent if no sanctions had been imposed. Therefore we estimate the actual growth to be
-3.99 lower than what it would be without the sanctions. In 2014 the growth would be 0.498
percent more than the actual value of 4.6 percent, meaning that 5.098 would have been the
growth rate in the absence of sanctions.
We also look at the GDP per capita growth rate. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 below are the
corresponding path plot and the gap plot for the synthetic control analysis. Iran’s population
increases over the post-sanctions period. Iran’s GDP per capita growth rate in 2012, 2013,
and 2014 are -8.61,-1.46, and 3.3 percent respectively. On the other hand, synthetic Iran’s
per capita growth rate is 2.25, 2.41, and 4.08. This means the values of the per capita GDP
for these years are -10.86, -3.87, and 0.78 percent lower than what they would have been if
there had been no sanction.
Figure 1.7: Annual GDP Growth Gap Between Iran and Synthetic Iran.
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Figure 1.8: GDP Growth: Iran vs. Synthetic Iran
1.4 Placebo Studies
To evaluate the reliability of the result that we obtained in the previous section using the
synthetic control method, we run two types of placebo studies (Abadie et al., 2015, Heckman
and Hotz, 1989). First, we perform the “in-time placebo” study in which we repeat the
synthetic control method but reassign the sanctions date to 2006, almost 5 years before the
actual sanctions were actually imposed.4
Figure 1.9 displays the result of our “in-time placebo” study. The synthetic control
perfectly resembles the actual GDP for the entire period of 1995 to 2006, as well as 2006 to
2011. There is no divergence between the actual GDP of Iran and synthetic Iran, and there is
no substantial effect estimated for the year 2006. This strengthens the case for the predictive
power of the synthetic control, and for the estimated effect of the actual sanctions of 2011.
We also run another in-time placebo analysis in which we set the date of the sanctions to
4 Among all the pre-sanctions years we can choose to run the placebo study, we pick the year 2006 to
implicitly confirm that the former U.N. sanctions of 2006 did not cause any structural shock to the GDP.
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be 2002. Following the same reasoning mentioned above, we do not anticipate to have a
substantial difference between figures of GDP of Iran and the synthetic Iran in this placebo
study. As we can see in Figure 1.10, synthetic Iran and Iran behave almost the same. To be
more precise and in order to have long enough period of time before the placebo sanctions
of 2002, we extend the validation period for the placebo analysis to start at 1990 instead of
1995. The result is provided in Figure 1.11. One of the limitations of the synthetic control
analysis is the lack of estimation for the standard errors. If there had been an estimation of
the standard errors, we could have provided a test of how significant is any reported effect
of the placebo studies. So by a simple comparison of numbers and trends, what we conclude
here is that the synthetic control does not report a substantial effect for the placebo sanctions
of 2002. But we will try to strengthen the result with the second placebo study mentioned
below when we don’t have any underlining distribution of the estimated effect.
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Figure 1.9: “In-time” Placebo Effect of 2006 Real GDP Iran vs. Synthetic Iran.
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Figure 1.10: “In-time” Placebo Effect of 2002 Real GDP Iran vs. Synthetic Iran.
Figure 1.11: “In-time” Placebo Effect of 2002 Real GDP Iran vs. Synthetic Iran.
Next, in the “in-space placebo” study, we iteratively apply the synthetic control method
that we used to estimate the effect of sanctions in Iran to every other control unit in the
donor pool. In each iteration we reassign the intervention of 2011 to one of the countries in
the donor pool and we remove Iran from the pool of the donors. Ultimately, we expect the
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method to estimate insignificant effects for the other countries compared to Iran. In other
words, when randomization is not an option and there is no distribution for the estimated
effect to check the significance, we can rely on a distribution of the estimated placebo effects
created by this study. We expect the estimated effect for Iran to be an outlier in the
distribution of the placebo effects.
Figure 1.10 displays the result of our in-space placebo study. Each plot in the figure
is a gap plot derived from a placebo synthetic control analysis in which the intervention is
assigned to one of the countries in the pool iteratively.
In Figure 1.12 part B we include the gap plots for all the control units in the pool.5 As we
can see, Iran is indeed an outlier in the distribution of the placebo effects. In Figure 1.12 part
D we exclude those countries with an MSPE (total discrepancy between the country and its
synthetic version for the pre-sanction period) of 3 times or higher than Iran6. The remaining
countries would be those with a better fit of the synthetic control. These countries would be
more probable to report a higher placebo effect and are better candidates to include in the
placebo distribution. In Figure 1.12 Part F we set the cutoff to be an MSPE of 2 times or
higher than Iran7. Not only is Iran an outlier in the most inclusive distribution of placebo
effects according to Figure 1.12 part B, but also by leaving out the countries with a high
MSPE in Figure 1.12 part D 1.12 Part F we observe that Iran is still an outlier among the
countries that would potentially report a higher placebo effect.8
5China is left out in all panels; no synthetic China could be constructed as the weighted average of the
donor pool
6Countries removed: Qatar, Bahrain, Turkey, Canada
7Additional countries removed: Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Libya
8One valid concern regarding the role of Oil-based countries as donors is potential existence of spillover
effects. Other countries in the donor pool should not be directly affected by the intervention. This placebo
study also justifies the choice of the countries as we can observe none of them are significantly affected by
Iran’s sanctions.
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(a) Including All the Controls.
(b) Leaving Out Controls with MSPE >3*MSPE of Iran.
(c) Leaving Out Controls with MSPE>2 *MSPE of Iran.
Figure 1.12: “In-space” Placebo Effect Distributions.
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1.5 Conclusion
We apply the synthetic control method to study the effect of recent sanctions on Iran’s
economic growth. As one of the wealthiest and most influential countries in the Middle East
and among OPEC countries, Iran plays a critical role in any political interactions. We use a
data-driven synthetic control unit constructed as a weighted average of the donor countries
to estimate the negative effects of sanctions on economic growth of this country. We estimate
that recent sanctions caused a 17.3 percent drop in GDP over the course of 3 years, with the
highest effect, a 12.0 percent drop, taking place in 2012.
Chapter 2
A Comparison Between the Synthetic
Control Method and the Dynamic
Panel Data Model
2.1 Introduction
The synthetic control method has been used in comparative case studies in which the ex-
istence of a counter-factual unit with high level of similarities and comparability is crucial.
On the other hand, many studies have been done and many methods have been offered in
order to overcome the potential shortages of a traditional regression framework in such case
studies. In this essay we compare the synthetic control method with a dynamic panel data
regression framework. First, we show that the synthetic control method provides an unbi-
ased estimator if the underlying model of the outcome variable of interest is a dynamic panel
data model. Second, we compare the prediction power of these two methods. To apply the
idea, we use the recent sanctions on Iran as the suitable case of a policy intervention and a
comparative case study.
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In a randomized experiment as well as an observational case study, ideally, the treatment
effect would be the difference of the values of the outcome variable between the treated unit
and the same unit under no treatment (Rubin, 1974, 1977, 1978). But ”the fundamental
problem of causal inference” (Holland, 1986) here is the unknown and unobserved values of
outcome for the treated units under no treatment. However, in randomized experiments,
the random assignment assures that treated units and controls are balanced or matched
in the covariates. Therefore a comparison between the treated and control units are very
informative about the treatment effect. In contrast, in an observational study, the random
assignment is not an option. Matching methods are one strand of the methods developed to
provide the essential similarities between treated and control units (Rosenbaum, 2005).
In the absence of randomization, we need to assume “some form of exogeneity” (Imbens,
2002) of the treatment assignment. We need to assume the assignment to the treatment is
exogenous to the covariates to enable us to compare the outcome between the treated units
and controls, and meaningfully attribute the difference to the treatment. As Imbens (2002)
shows, the literature has referred to this assumption under different names: unconfounded-
ness (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), selection on observable (Barnow et al., 1980, Fitzgerald
et al., 1998), or conditional independence (Lechner, 1999). Under this assumption, many
studies have designed unbiased estimators for the treatment effect. Proposed methods can
be summarized into few categories such as traditional regression of the outcome of interest
on the covariates (Rubin, 1977), matching on covariates (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015, Card and
Krueger, 1994), propensity score (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, 2002, Heckman et al., 1997),
and a combination of these approaches (Abadie and Imbens, 2002).
In large-sample studies, “matching” methods aim to equate (or “balance”) the distribu-
tion of covariates in the treated and control units. But in small-sample social comparative
studies, where the interventions affect aggregate entities such as countries or states, it is often
very difficult to find suitable controls that are unaffected by the intervention and also have
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similar characteristics to those of the affected unit in the pre-intervention period (Abadie
et al., 2010, Collier, 1993, Lijphart, 1971). Despite this fact, for example, in a well-known
study, Card and Krueger (1994) use the matching method to explore the effect of the 1992
change in minimum wages on the unemployment rate in New Jersey. They surveyed 410
fast-food restaurants in New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania (which shows high similarities
to New Jersey) before and after the rise. Comparisons of employment growth at stores in
New Jersey and Pennsylvania provide simple estimates of the effect of the higher minimum
wage.
Instead of using a single control unit, the synthetic control method (Abadie et al., 2010,
2015, Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) uses a weighted average of potential control units to
provide a synthetic control unit that behaves more closely to the affected unit in terms
of related predictors of outcome of interest. For example, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
develop a synthetic unit control as a weighted average of two other Spanish regions to find
the effect of an outbreak of terrorism in Basque Country in the late 1960s, on the economic
growth of this region. Abadie et al. (2010) study the effect of California’s tobacco control
program (Proposition 99) on cigarette consumption using the synthetic control method. In
another study, Abadie et al. (2015) implement the synthetic control method to study the
effect of German reunification in 1990 on west Germany’s GDP.
As mentioned earlier we can also rely on a regression framework to predict the effect of an
intervention on an outcome. A dynamic panel data model would be a suitable model to study
the effect of policy interventions on the macro economic variables such as economic growth in
aggregate entities such as countries. In this essay, we compare the synthetic control method
with a dynamic panel data model. For the empirical analysis, we use recent sanctions on
Iran as a suitable case of a policy intervention.
First, in Section 2.2 we confirm that the synthetic control method can provide an unbiased
estimator if the outcome variable of interest follows a dynamic panel data model. This
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strengthens the comparison. In Section 2.3, we estimate the dynamic panel data model
to find the effect of recent sanction on Iran’s GDP, and we compare the prediction power
between the two methods. The details of the synthetic control estimation can be found in
the first chapter. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Unbiasedness of the Synthetic Control Estimator
We use this section to clarify that under specific assumptions the synthetic control estimator
will be an unbiased estimator in a two way error component dynamic panel data model.
For unit i = 1, ..., J+1 and t = 1, ...T0, ...T , where T0 is the last period before the intervention,
we have:
yNit = ρy
N
it−1 + Zit
′θ +Xi
′γ + µi + δt + εit (2.1)
Zit = A1Zit−1 + A2y
N
it−1 + µzi + δzt + νit (2.2)
where yNit is the outcome that would be observed for country i at time t in the absence of
the intervention, for unit i = 1, ..., J + 1 and t = 1, ..., T0, ..., T . Let y
I
it is the outcome that
would be observed for unit i at time t if unit i is exposed to the intervention in periods
T0 + 1 to T . δt is time fixed effects which we assume to be constant across units. X
′
i is a
(1 ×M) row vector of time-invariant explanatory variables and γ is a (M × 1), and θ is a
(K × 1) vector of parameters. µi is the unit i fixed effect. Z
′
it is a (1 × K) row vector of
time-varying covariates that moves over time by a process given in equation (2.2). εit and
νit are the idiosyncratic shocks at unit level with mean zero. So, for t = 1, ..., T0 and all
i = 1, ..., J + 1, we have that yNit = y
I
it
1.
1 We consider our model to be a specific case of Abadie et al. (2010)’s factor model. In the paper, they
show that the synthetic control estimator is an unbiased estimator for the intervention effect in a factor
model such as:
yNit = δt + θtZi + λtµi + εit (2.3)
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Following Abadie et al. (2010), let αit = y
I
it− yNit be the effect of the intervention for unit
i at time t, and let Dit be an indicator that equals 1 if unit i is exposed to the intervention
at time t, and equals 0 otherwise. Therefore, the observed outcome for unit i at time t is
Yit = y
N
it + αitDit. We assume unit i = 1 is exposed to the intervention for t = T0 + 1, ..., T ,
therefore we want to estimate α1t = y
I
1t − yN1t for t = T0 + 1, ..., T . Note that yI1t is observed,
so we just need to estimate yN1t .
We start at one period post intervention, and we show that the synthetic control estimator
which uses the weighted average of the donors when the outcome variable of interest is unob-
servable, is an unbiased estimator if the outcome variable follows the DPD data generating
process mentioned in 2.1. We will provide the same derivation for second post intervention
period, and we conclude under the same assumption, the synthetic control provides and
unbiased estimator if the outcome variable follows a DPD generating process.
Period T0 + 1:
When we substitute (2.2) into (2.1), we obtain:
yNit = ρy
N
it−1 + Zit−1
′A′1θ + y
N
it−1A
′
2θ + µ
′
ziθ + δ
′
ztθ + ν
′
itθ +Xi
′γ + µi + δt + εit (2.4)
Now we use (J × 1) vector of weights W = (w2, w3, w4, ..., wJ+1)′ such that wj ≥ 0 for
j = 2, ..., J + 1 and w2 + w3 + w4 + ...+ wj+1 = 1. Therefore, we have:
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jt =[ρ+ A
′
2θ]
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jt−1 +
J+1∑
j=2
wjZjt−1
′A′1θ +
J+1∑
j=2
wjµ
′
zjθ + δ
′
ztθ
+
J+1∑
j=2
wjν
′
jtθ +
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj
′γ +
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj + δt +
J+1∑
j=2
wjεjt
(2.5)
where δt is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across units, Zi is a (r × 1) vector of
observed covariates (not affected by the intervention), θt is a (1× r) vector of unknown parameters, λt is a
(1 × F ) vector of unobserved common factors, µi is an (F × 1) vector of unknown factor loadings, and the
error terms εit are unobserved transitory shocks with zero mean.
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So in the first post intervention period we have:
yN1T0+1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
1T0+1
=A(yNiT0 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jT0
) + (Z1T0 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZjT0)
′A′1θ + (X1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj)
′γ
+ (µz1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµzj)
′θ + (µ1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj)
+
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ν1t − νjt)′θ +
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ε1t − εjt)
(2.6)
where A = ρ+ A′2θ is a scalar. Note that δ
′
ztθs will be dropped out of the equation because
sum of the weights is 1. Following Abadie et al. (2010), let Y prei be a (T0 × 1) vector of
pre-intervention values of y for unit i. Therefore for the first unit (i = 1) we have
Y pre1 =

y11
y12
.
.
.
y1T0

, and Y1
pre
(−1)=

y10
y11
.
.
.
y1T0−1

, Zpre1
′
=

Z11
′
Z12
′
.
.
.
Z1T0
′

,and Z1
pre
(−1)
′
=

Z10
′
Z11
′
.
.
.
Z1T0−1
′

so:
Y pre1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjY
pre
j =A[Y1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjYj
pre
(−1)] + [(Z1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZj
pre
(−1))]
′A′1θ
+ ιT0(X1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj)
′γ + ιT0 [(µz1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµzj)]
′θ + ιT0(µ1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj)
+ (νpre1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjν
pre
j )
′θ + (εpre1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjε
pre
j )
(2.7)
Note that by construction (Z1
pre
(−1)−
∑J+1
j=2 wjZj
pre
(−1))
′ is a (T0×K) matrix. ιT0 is a vector
of ones of length T0. Since (X1 −
∑J+1
j=2 wjXj)
′γ is a scalar, ιT0(X1 −
∑J+1
j=2 wjXj)
′γ is a
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(T0 × 1) vector with elements equal to (X1 −
∑J+1
j=2 wjXj)
′γ.
We multiply both sides of (2.7) by (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0 , and we add and subtract the resulting
expression from (2.6). So we can write:
yN1T0+1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jT0+1
=[(ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0(Y
pre
1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjY
pre
j )]
+ A[(y1T0 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjyjT0)− (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0(Y1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjYj
pre
(−1))]
+ [(Z1T0 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZjT0)
′A′1θ − (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0((Z1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZj
pre
(−1))
′A′1θ)]
+ [(X1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj)
′γ − (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0ιT0(X1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj)
′γ]
+ [(µz1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµzj)
′θ − (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0ιT0(µz1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµzj)]
′θ
+ [(µ1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj)− (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0ιT0(µ1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj)]
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ν1t0+1 − νjT0+1)− (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0(ν
pre
1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjν
pre
j )]
′θ
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ε1T0+1 − εjT0+1)− (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0(ε
pre
1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjε
pre
j )]
(2.8)
Note that in this equation we cancel out (µ1 −
∑J+1
j=2 wjµj), (µz1 −
∑J+1
j=2 wjµzj), and also
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(X1 −
∑J+1
j=2 wjXj)
′γ. Noting that (ι′T0ιT0)
−1 = 1
T0
, we may rewrite (2.8) as:
yN1T0+1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jT0+1
=
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(ypre1t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
pre
jt )]
+ A[(y1T0 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjyjT0)−
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(y1t
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjyjt
pre
(−1))]
+ [(Z1T0 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZjT0)
′A′1θ −
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
((Z1t
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZjt
pre
(−1))
′A′1θ)]
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ν1T0+1 − νjT0+1)−
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(νpre1t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjν
pre
jt )]
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ε1T0+1 − εjT0+1)−
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(εpre1t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjε
pre
jt )]
(2.9)
Now suppose we find the synthetic control method weights W ∗ = (w∗2, ...w
∗
j+1) such
that for each t ∈ (1, ..., T0) we get
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jyjt = y1t and
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jZjt = Z1t . Then
1
T0
∑T0
t=1(y
pre
1t −
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jy
pre
jt ) which is the average of total deviation between observed val-
ues of outcome for the first unit i = 1 and the synthetic control unit, during the pre-
intervention period, is equal to zero, and so is 1
T0
∑T0
t=1(y1t
pre
(−1) −
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jyjt
pre
(−1)), and so is
1
T0
∑T0
t=1(Z1t
pre
(−1) −
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jZjt
pre
(−1)). For the last period before the intervention T0 we also
have y1T0 −
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jyjT0 = 0 and also Z1T0 −
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jZjT0 = 0. The rest of the terms are
idiosyncratic error terms with mean zero. Therefore, eventually we can show for t = T0 + 1:
E[yN1T0+1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jT0+1
] = 0 (2.10)
Period T0 + 2:
Let us restate the dynamic panel data model in equation (2.11) and (2.12):
yNit = ρy
N
it−1 + Zit
′θ +Xi
′γ + µi + δt + εit (2.11)
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Zit = A1Zit−1 + A2y
N
it−1 + µzi + δzt + νit (2.12)
and let us go one period back:
yNit−1 = ρy
N
it−2 + Zit−1
′θ +Xi
′γ + µi + δt−1 + εit−1 (2.13)
Zit−1 = A1Zit−2 + A2y
N
it−2 + µzi + δzt−1 + νit−1 (2.14)
So by plugging in Zit from (2.12) we can write (2.11) as:
yNit = ρy
N
it−1 + [A1Zit−1 + A2y
N
it−1 + µzi + δzt + νit]
′θ +Xi
′γ + µi + δt + εit (2.15)
Now by inserting (2.13) for yit−1 and (2.14) for Zit−1 and rearranging the terms we have:
yNit =Gy
N
it−2 + Zit−2
′H + µzi
′I + δzt−1
′B + ν ′it−1B +Xi
′J +Kµi +Kδt−1 +Kεit−1
+ δzt
′θ + ν ′itθ + δt + εit
(2.16)
where A = [(ρ+A′2θ)ρ] and G = A+A
′
2B are scalars. H = A
′
1B is a (K× 1) vector, µ′zi is a
(1×K) row vector, I = B+ θ is a (K × 1) vector, and B = [[ρ+A′2θ](θ) +A′1θ] is a (K × 1)
vector. J = C+γ where γ is a (K2× 1) vector of coefficients on the Xi and C = γ[ρ+A2/θ]
is a (K2 × 1) vector as well, and K = [ρ+ A′2θ] is a scalars and θ is a (K × 1) vector.
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jt =G
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jt−2 +
J+1∑
j=2
wjZjt−2
′H +
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj
′J+
J+1∑
j=2
wjµzj
′I +K
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj + δzt−1
′B + δzt
′θ +Kδt−1 + δt
+
J+1∑
j=2
wjν
′
jt−1B +
J+1∑
j=2
wjν
′
jtθ +K
J+1∑
j=2
wjεjt−1 +
J+1∑
j=2
wjεjt
(2.17)
Now we can write :
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yN1t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jt =G(y
N
1t−2 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jt−2) + (Z1t−2 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZjt−2)
′H + (X1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj)
′J
+ (µz1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµzj)
′I +K(µ1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj)
+
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ν1t−1 − νjt−1)′B +
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ν1t − νjt)′θ
+K(
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ε1t−1 − εjt−1)) +
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ε1t − εjt)
(2.18)
So if we stack the pre-intervention matrices we have:
Y pre1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjY
pre
j =G[Y1
pre
(−2) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjYj
pre
(−2)] + [(Z1
pre
(−2) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZj
pre
(−2))]
′H
+ ιT0(X1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj)
′J + ιT0 [(µz1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµzj)]
′I + ιT0K(µ1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj)
+ [(ν1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjνj
pre
(−1))]
′B + [(νpre1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjν
pre
j )]
′θ
+K(ε1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjεj
pre
(−1)) + (ε
pre
1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjε
pre
j )
(2.19)
We multiply both sides of (2.19) by (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0 , and we add and subtract the resulting
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expression from (2.18). So we can write:
yN1T0+2 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jT0+2
=[(ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0(Y
pre
1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjY
pre
j )]
+ [(y1T0 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjyjT0)
′ − (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0(y1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjyj
pre
(−1))
′]G
+ [(Z1T0 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZjT0)
′ − (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0((Z1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZj
pre
(−1))
′)]H
+ [(X1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj)
′ − (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0ιT0(X1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjXj)
′]J
+ [(µz1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµzj)
′I − (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0ιT0(µz1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµzj)]
′I
+ [(µ1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj)− (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0ιT0(µ1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj)]K
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ν1t0+1 − νjT0+1)′ − (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0(ν1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjνj
pre
(−1))
′]B
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ν1t0+2 − νjT0+2)− (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0(ν
pre
1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjν
pre
j )]
′θ
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ε1T0+1 − εjT0+1)− (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0(ε1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjεj
pre
(−1))]K
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ε1T0+2 − εjT0+2)− (ι′T0ιT0)
−1ι′T0(ε
pre
1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjε
pre
j )]
(2.20)
Finally we can write:
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yN1T0+2 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jT0+2
=
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(ypre1t −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
pre
jt )]
+ [(y1T0 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjyjT0)
′G− 1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(y1t
pre
(−2) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjyjt
pre
(−2))
′G]
+ [(Z1T0 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZjT0)
′H − 1
T0
T0∑
t=1
((Z1t
pre
(−2) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjZjt
pre
(−2))
′H)]
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ν1t0+1 − νjT0+1)′ −
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(ν1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjνj
pre
(−1))
′]B
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ν1t0+2 − νjT0+2)−
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(νpre1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjν
pre
j )]
′θ
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ε1T0+1 − εjT0+1)−
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(ε1
pre
(−1) −
J+1∑
j=2
wjεj
pre
(−1))]K
+ [
J+1∑
j=2
wj(ε1T0+2 − εjT0+2)−
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(εpre1 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjε
pre
j )]
(2.21)
Now again consider the synthetic control method weights W ∗ = (w∗2, ...w
∗
j+1) such that
for each t ∈ (1, ..., T0) we get
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jyjt = y1t and
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jZjt = Z1t . Then
1
T0
∑T0
t=1(y
pre
1t −∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jy
pre
jt ) which is the average of total deviation between observed values of outcome
for the first unit i = 1 and the synthetic control unit, during the pre-intervention period,
is equal to zero, and so is 1
T0
∑T0
t=1(y1t
pre
(−2) −
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jyjt
pre
(−2)), and so is
1
T0
∑T0
t=1(Z1t
pre
(−2) −∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jZjt
pre
(−2)). For the last period before the intervention T0 we also have y1T0−
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jyjT0 =
0 and also Z1T0 −
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jZjT0 = 0. The rest of the terms are idiosyncratic error terms with
mean zero. Therefore, eventually we can show for t = T0 + 2:
E[yN1T0+2 −
J+1∑
j=2
wjy
N
jT0+2
] = 0 (2.22)
This can be done with all the post intervention periods. Therefore, this shows that the
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bias of the synthetic control estimator, given the assumptions mentioned above, is zero in a
DPD data generating process such as equation (2.1).
2.3 Empirical Analysis, Estimation of the Dynamic
Panel Data Model
Abadie et al. (2015) compare the synthetic control method with a regression framework.
They show that a regression counter-factual unit for post-intervention period is a ((t−T0)×1)
vector of β̂′X1, where β̂ is the matrix of regression coefficients of Y0 on X0. Y0 is the matrix
of the values of the outcome variable for control units, X1 is (K × 1) vector containing
the values of predictors of the treated unit that we aim to match as closely as possible
and X0 is the (K × J) matrix containing the values of the same variables for the donor
units. Therefore the regression estimated counter-factual of the affected unit is Y0W
reg
where W reg = X ′0(X0X
′
0)
−1X1. (See Abadie et al. (2015))
In fact they show that similar to the synthetic control method, the regression estimator
is a weighting estimator with weights that sum to one, and the counter-factual unit in a
regression is also a linear combination of the control units, and the weights on the controls
sum to one. But unlike the synthetic control method, in the regression, weights are not
restricted to the [0, 1] interval. This allows for “extrapolation outside the support of the
data” (King and Zeng, 2006).
The point they make above highlights an advantage of the synthetic control method over
the regression. Here we look more closely at the counter-factual units created from both
methods, the synthetic control unit, and the counter-factual unit driven from a regression.
We compare the fit of the synthetic control unit with the prediction power of the estimated
counter-factual from the regression for the pre-intervention period.
To do the empirical analysis, we consider recent sanctions against Iran as a suitable case
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of policy intervention in an aggregate entity. The outcome variable of interest is GDP, and
as mentioned earlier, we consider a dynamic panel data in which the value of GDP in each
period depends on the lagged values. We think this is a reasonable model to consider for
economic indicators such as GDP.
For the synthetic control empirical result we rely on the result provided in the first
chapter. The study uses the synthetic control method to estimate the effect of intensification
of sanctions in 2011 on Iran’s GDP and it estimates that Irans real GDP suffered a hit of
more than 17 percent in the period between 2011 and 2014.
2.3.1 Sample and Data
Same as the first chapter, the empirical analysis is based on annual country level panel
data for the period 1980-2014. As international sanctions were imposed in 2011, this yields
a pre-intervention period of more than 30 years. Our control pool (called donor pool in
the synthetic control method) includes eight OPEC member countries: Algeria, Ecuador,
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.2 Also, in
order to increase the size of the pool, we add countries from major non-OPEC oil producer
countries (i.e. Canada and China) as well as the rest of non-OPEC Iran’s neighbors with
close economic similarities (i.e. Oman, Bahrain, and Turkey). The variables used in our
analysis are listed in the data appendix along with descriptions and data sources. The
outcome variable of interest, Y jt is the log of real GDP for country j at time t. We also
use GDP growth as the outcome variable of interest in some of the estimations. GDP
is Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)-adjusted and measured in constant 2011 international
dollars. Because our control countries are heavily dependent on rents from natural resources,
for the pre-sanction predictors, we rely on a standard set of economic growth indicators for
2We left Venezuela and Iraq out of the pool due to economic fluctuations in these countries during the
period of the analysis. We also left Angola out due to data limitations.
CHAPTER 2. 35
these countries.
2.3.2 Difference-in-Difference
Ever since Ashenfelter and Card (1985) use the longitudinal structure of earnings of trainees
and a comparison group to estimate the effectiveness of training for participants in the 1976
CETA programs, the use of the ”Diff-in-Diff” technique has become very widespread. In
another study, Card and Krueger (1994) evaluate the impact of the 1992 change in min-
imum wages on the unemployment rate in New Jersey. Using the difference in difference
method, they provide simple estimates of the effect of the higher minimum wage by com-
paring the employment growth in New Jersey and Pennsylvania (where the minimum wage
was constant). Unlike the synthetic control method that creates a weighted average of the
donor control units, the diff-in-diff methods find controls with a high level of similarity with
the treated unit, and hence comparison of the outcome variable of interest for the treated
units with the value of the controls would provide a simple estimate of the effect of the
treatment/policy intervention.
In generic term we may write the Diff-in-Diff model as below:
yit = β0 + β1(treatedi) + β2(timet) + δ(treatedi × timet) + Zit′θ + εit (2.23)
where treatedi is a dummy which is equal to 1 for the treated units and 0 for controls.
The coefficient β1 will pickup the default difference of yit between treated unit and control.
Variable timet is a dummy equal to 1 for the treatment period (we include three difference
dummies for three years of treatment in our case). The coefficient β2 picks up the effect
of time difference on yit. The coefficient of the interaction is interpreted as the effect of
treatment. Zit is the set of predictors which may be included in the regression. In our setup
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we have three interaction terms. To be clear, we consider :
GDPit =β0 + β1(D1) + β2(T2012) + β3(T2013) + β4(T2014)+
δ1(D1× T2012) + δ2(D1× T2013) + δ3(D1× T2014) + Zit′θ + εit
(2.24)
Bertrand et al. (2004) show that with many years of data, we need to adjust the standard
errors for auto-correlation. One simple remedy suggested by the authors is to cluster on the
unit of observation panel identifier. We follow this suggestion by using a panel data regression
instead of pooled OLS.
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Table 2.1: Difference in Difference Estimation Result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lgdp lgdp lgdp gdpgrowth gdpgrowth gdpgrowth
Iran 2012 -0.185∗ 0.0721 -0.0864 -10.90∗∗∗ -11.32∗∗∗ -12.93∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.0763) (0.0677) (0.732) (0.956) (1.010)
Iran 2013 -0.231∗ 0.155∗∗ -0.0242 -3.074∗∗∗ -3.846∗∗∗ -5.429∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.0676) (0.0405) (0.736) (0.908) (0.963)
Iran 2014 -0.201 0.219∗∗∗ 0.0449 2.428∗∗∗ 1.442 -0.138
(0.138) (0.0666) (0.0295) (0.719) (0.890) (0.834)
Iran 1.106∗∗∗ 0.00623 0.497∗∗ -1.588∗∗ -0.463 -0.454
(0.372) (0.267) (0.205) (0.792) (1.195) (1.118)
2012 0.735∗∗∗ 0.0941∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.713 0.467 7.657∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.0410) (0.211) (0.732) (0.756) (2.642)
2013 0.762∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.137 0.0868 7.218∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.0468) (0.209) (0.736) (0.758) (2.735)
2014 0.775∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ -0.566 -0.485 6.602∗∗
(0.138) (0.0572) (0.202) (0.719) (0.718) (2.830)
Log pop 0.789∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(0.0866) (0.138)
popgrowth 0.234 0.417
(0.379) (0.355)
Rents -0.769 -1.115∗∗ 6.232 -0.0190
(0.544) (0.550) (3.960) (1.978)
Trade 0.473 0.285 0.633 -2.660
(0.481) (0.387) (2.440) (1.979)
Agriculture -5.859∗∗∗ -4.129∗∗ 0.0825 13.33∗∗
(1.993) (2.033) (3.603) (5.222)
Intercept 5.483∗∗∗ -6.946∗∗∗ -1.771 4.331∗∗∗ 2.014 -2.125
(0.372) (1.672) (2.325) (0.792) (1.946) (2.973)
N 480 294 294 442 295 295
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.The dependent variable is log GDP and GDP growth.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.1 summarizes the results of the diff-in-diff analysis. In the first three regressions
the dependent variable is log GDP, and for the rest it is GDP annual growth. Frist regres-
sion is a simple diff-in-diff model with a dummy for Iran, 3 time dummies representing 3
consecutive years of sanction, and three interaction of time dummies and Iran dummy. The
result of the sanctions is estimated to be a drop of 18.5 percent in 2012, 23.1 percent in 2013,
and 20.1 percent for 2014. The estimated coefficient report a dramatic drop in GDP for all
three years, however the third coefficient is not significant and the first and second values
are significant at the 10 percent level. In the second column we add the predictors in the
regression and in the third column, we consider time fixed effects for the entire period. The
result does not follow the logical direction for the second and third regression. This might
be due to the small sample. The identification of the diff-in-diff here comes from only three
data points. We only have one treated unit in our case (Iran) and we only have 3 years
of the treatment. This might not be in support of a diff-in-diff study. However when we
choose annual growth of GDP to be outcome variable of interest the result of the diff-in-diff
estimation becomes more in line with previous observed result. The more important point
here is that in the diff-in-diff analysis, we ignore the dynamic term in the log GDP data
generating process. Later in this chapter, we will see the weight of the dynamic term in the
data generating process is strong and significant. We provide unit root and co-integration
test later in this chapter and we address this matter in depth. However, as we can observe
with the growth which follows a stationary process, the result of the diff-in-diff estimation
is in line with previous result.
As mentioned above, in the fourth regression, we use a simple diff-in-diff analysis with
the time dummies for sanctions period, the dummy for Iran, and the interactions. The effect
of the first year of sanctions is reported to be a drop of 10.9 percent in the growth, it is
further reduced by a drop of 3.074 percent in 2013, and it is followed by a positive growth of
2.428 in 2014. All the three coefficients in this regression are significant at 1 percent level.
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In the fourth regression we add the predictors to the regression. The estimated effect of
sanctions for is similar to the previous regression. In the first year Iran’s GDP growth drops
by 10.19 percent, followed by a drop of 2.569 percent, and a positive growth of 2.802 percent
for 2014. The estimated positive coefficient of 2014 is significant at the 10 percent level. The
last column includes time dummies for the entire period of analysis. The effect of the first
year of sanctions is reported to be a significant drop of 11.39 percent in the growth, further
reduces by a drop of 3.693 percent in 2013, and a positive growth of 1.705 in 2014. The last
coefficient is not significant.
As mentioned earlier, due to the fact that there is not as many treated unit in the data
as the controls (in fact there is only one treated unit), and there is not as many years after
treatment as pre-treatment, we believe the identification of the estimated diff-in-diff effect
might be weak.
2.3.3 Fixed Effect and First Difference Model
Equivalent to equation 2.1, in the dynamic panel data model for country i ∈ 1, ..., J + 1 and
for t ∈ 1, ..., T0, ..., T we have in generic terms:
yNit = ρy
N
it−1 + Zit
′θ +Xj
′γ + δt + µi + εit (2.25)
and in our specific application:
GDPit = ρGDPit−1 +Xit
′β + δt + µi + νit (2.26)
where GDP in this set up depends on the lagged value of itself, parameter ρ captures the
effect of the lagged GDP, Xit is the set of predictors, same as those used in synthetic control
method. Now to cancel out the countries fixed effects µi we subtract the average of each
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country.
G̃DPit = ρ ˜GDPit−1 + X̃it
′
β + δ̃t + ν̃it. (2.27)
where G̃DPit = GDPit − GDPi and the GDPi is the average of GDP for country i over
the validation period (G̃DPit = GDPit − 1T (GDPi1 + GDPi2 + ... + GDPiT )) . Due to the
correlation between ν̃it and ˜GDPit−1 (Nickell (1981), Bond (2002)), we use one period lagged
values of the explanatory variables (Xit−1) as instruments.
Another approach to eliminate the fixed effects is suggested by Anderson and Hsiao
(1981) in the form of the first difference approach:
¨GDPit = ρ ¨GDPit−1 + Ẍit
′
β + δ̈t + ν̈it. (2.28)
where ¨GDPit = GDPit −GDPit−1 and so on. In this set up, the first difference cancels out
the fixed effects, however the transformed lagged dependent variable is still correlated with
the error term. Anderson and Hsiao suggest using level instruments GDPit−2 or the lagged
difference GDPit−2 −GDPit−3 as the instruments for the differences lagged endogeneous
regressor GDPit − GDPit−1. However, Arellano et al. (1989) suggest using levels due to
lower variance and no points of singularities where a condition of ρ = 0 invalidates the
instruments.
The estimators mentioned above are consistent with our assumptions, however in order
to increase efficient in the next section we move to a more inclusive set of instruments and
a more comprehensive dynamic panel data analysis.
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2.3.4 GMM and System GMM Estimation
The Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) dy-
namic panel estimators are very popular. They are general estimators designed for situations
with : 1) small T, large N panels, meaning few time periods and many individuals; 2) a lin-
ear functional relationship; 3) a single left-hand-side variable that is dynamic, depending on
its own past realizations; 4) independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, meaning
correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error; 5) fixed individual effects;
and 6) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but not across them (e.g.,
see Roodman (2006)).
Arellano-Bond estimation starts by transforming all regressors, usually by differencing,
and uses the Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen, 1982), and so is called Difference
GMM. The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator augments Arellano-Bond by making an
additional assumption, that first differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with
the fixed effects. This allows the introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically
improve efficiency. It builds a system of two equations -the original equation as well as the
transformed one- and is known as the System GMM estimator.
To open the methods mentioned above, let us go back to the general dynamic panel data
model we consider:
GDPit = β0 + ρGDPit−1 +Xit
′β + δt + µi + νit (2.29)
With the Arellano-Bond estimation, to improve efficiency, we can take the Anderson-Hsiao
approach further, using longer lags of the dependent variable as additional instruments. So
Arellano-Bond estimation starts with the first-difference transform (just like the Anderson
Hsiao estimation discussed earlier) followed by a GMM estimator. If we assume a matrix M∆
with the orthogonal of -1’s and sub-diagonal of 1’s just to the right, and the matrix IN the
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identity matrix of order N then the transformation is to multiply the model by (M∆ ⊗ IN).
This takes us to equation (2.28).
M∆=

−1 1 0 0 . .
0 −1 1 0 0 .
0 0 −1 1 0 .
. .
. .
0 . . 0 −1 1

The fixed effects are gone, but as mentioned earlier, the lagged dependent variable is
still potentially endogenous as well as any predetermined variables in the regressors set that
are not strictly exogenous become potentially endogenous. But longer lags of the regressors
remain orthogonal to the error, and available as instruments.
Another possible transformation can be the “orthogonal deviations transform” Proposed
by Arellano and Bover (1995), in which rather than subtracting the previous observation,
we subtract the average of all available future observations. Like first-differencing, taking
orthogonal deviations removes fixed effects. In a balanced panel the transformation can be
done by multiplication of the model by transformation is to multiply the model by (M⊥ ⊗
IN), where the matrix IN is the identity matrix of order N and M⊥ is as below. Because
lagged observations of a variable do not enter the formula for the transformation, they
remain orthogonal to the transformed errors, and available as instruments. On balanced
panels, GMM estimators based on the two transforms return numerically identical coefficient
estimates, holding the instrument set fixed (Arellano and Bover, 1995)3.
3Our result is robust to the choice of the transformation (FD or FOD, in order to avoid too many reported
regressions we will not provide the result of this transformation in the tables.
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M⊥=

√
T−1
T
− 1√
T (T−1)
− 1√
T (T−1)
. . .√
T−1
T−2 −
1√
(T−1)(T−2)
. . .√
T−2
T−3 . . .
.
.
.

A potential weakness in the Arellano-Bond DPD estimator was revealed in later work
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). As Blundell and Bond (1998)
demonstrate in simulations, if yit is close to a random walk, then Difference GMM per-
forms poorly because past levels convey little information about future changes, so that
un-transformed lags (levels) are weak instruments for transformed variables.
Note that we can also write the model above as:
∆GDPit = (ρ− 1)GDPit−1 +Xit′β + δt + µi + νit (2.30)
So the model can equally be thought of as being for the level or increase of y. Therefore:
∆GDPit−1 = (ρ− 1)GDPit−2 +Xit−1′β + δt−1 + µi + νit−1 (2.31)
This will introduce more options for instruments as long as ρ does not equal to 1. So where
Arellano-Bond instruments endogenous first differences or orthogonal deviations with lagged
levels, Blundell-Bond instruments levels with differences. For variables that follow a random
walk process in fact, past changes may indeed be more predictive of current levels than past
levels are of current changes, so that the new instruments are more relevant (Blundell and
Bond, 1998, Roodman, 2006). Blundell-Bond estimation builds a stacked data set with twice
the observations to use new moment conditions while retaining the Arellano Bond moments.
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The matrix M+∗ is as follow:
M+∗ =
M∗
I
 where M∗ can be M∆ or M⊥4.
We used the methods mentioned above to estimate our model mentioned in equation
(2.29). The results of the estimations of models mentioned above are summarized in Table
2.2.
4The notation for matrix M is borrowed from Roodman (2006).
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Table 2.2: Dynamic Panel Data Model Estimation Result
(FE) (FD) (AB) (AB) (BB) (BB)
lgdp lgdp lgdp lgdp lgdp lgdp
Iran 2012 -0.121*** -0.097*** -0.117*** -0.111*** -0.123*** -0.114***
(0.0153) (0.0138) (0.0213) (0.0159) (0.0107) (0.0117)
Iran 2013 -0.0659*** -.0418 -0.0585*** -0.0616*** -0.0659*** -0.0666***
(0.0149) (.0419) (0.0196) (0.0147) (0.00625) (0.0112)
Iran 2014 0.00150 0.022 0.00808 -0.00451 -0.000283 -0.00414
(0.0152) (0.058) (0.0187) (0.0161) (0.00612) (0.0112)
L.lgdp 0.901*** 0.927*** 0.966*** 0.979*** 0.992*** 1.005***
(0.0573) (0.317) (0.0203) (0.0199) (0.0141) (0.00867)
Log pop 0.0414 0.079 0.0466** 0.0680* 0.0108 -0.000139
(0.0284) (0.138) (0.0208) (0.0378) (0.0164) (0.00306)
Rents -0.128 -0.056 -0.0216 0.0951 -0.0224 -0.00575
(0.0947) (0.094) (0.0274) (0.0647) (0.0183) (0.0261)
Trade -0.00564 (-0.069) -0.0529* -0.0452 0.00822 0.0138
(0.0445) (0.079) (0.0322) (0.0565) (0.0247) (0.0147)
Agriculture -0.173 0.034 0.0300 -0.109 0.0169 0.0621
(0.203) (0.233) (0.127) (0.140) (0.0937) (0.0625)
N 279 265 272 272 286 286
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
AB AR(2) (Pr > z) . . 0.364 0.252 0.310 0.228
Overid. (Pr > z) . . 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses.The dependent variable is log GDP.
Variables in the FD model are first-differenced.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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The first three regressors are dummies representing Iran undergoing sanctions as of 2012,
2013, and 2014. For the predictors we again rely on a set of growth predictors that are
standard in analysis of countries heavily dependent on natural resources rent. Specifically,
we include log of population, and rents, trade, and agriculture value added as percentage
of GDP. For the Fixed Effect and First Difference model we rely on the standard set of
instrument for these models. For the Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond model we treat the
lagged of log GDP as endogenous and other predictors as predetermined.
The effect of first year of sanctions on the country’s GDP is a negative effect from 9.7
percent to 12.28 percent. According to the fixed effect model:
∆lGDP2012 = −0.121
∆lGDP2013 = −0.0659 + 0.901 ∗∆lGDP2012 = −0.175
∆lGDP2014 = 0.00150 + 0.901 ∗∆lGDP2013 = −0.156.
Following the same calculation for the first difference model:

∆lGDP2012 = −0.097
∆lGDP2013 = −0.0418 + 0.927 ∗∆lGDP2012 = −0.1317
∆lGDP2014 = 0.022 + 0.927 ∗∆lGDP2013 = −0.1001.
For the Arellano Bond with time fixed effects:

∆lGDP2012 = −0.117
∆lGDP2013 = −0.0585 + 0.966 ∗∆lGDP2012 = −0.1715
∆lGDP2014 = 0.00808 + 0.966 ∗∆lGDP2013 = −0.1576.
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For the Arellano Bond with no time fixed effects:

∆lGDP2012 = −0.111
∆lGDP2013 = −0.0616 + 0.979 ∗∆lGDP2012 = −0.1703
∆lGDP2014 = −0.00451 + 0.979 ∗∆lGDP2013 = −0.1712.
For the Blundell Bond with time fixed effects:

∆lGDP2012 = −0.123
∆lGDP2013 = −0.0659 + 0.992 ∗∆lGDP2012 = −0.1879
∆lGDP2014 = −0.000283 + 0.992 ∗∆lGDP2013 = −0.1867.
And finally for the Blundell Bond with no time fixed effects:

∆lGDP2012 = −0.114
∆lGDP2013 = −0.0666 + 1.005 ∗∆lGDP2012 = −0.1812
∆lGDP2014 = −0.00414 + 1.005 ∗∆lGDP2013 = −0.1862.
The Arellano Bond test of AR(2) of νit is reported in Table 2.2. If the idiosyncratic part of
the error term νit is serially correlated of order 1, then yit−2 will be endogenous to νit−1 and
therefore would not serve as a good instrument. Because in Arellano Bond estimation we
take first difference first, then of course the AR(1) process in the ∆νit is normal, so we look at
the AR(2) test result of the differences error term (and the εit includes fixed effects therefore
is serially correlated). The result does not support the AR(2) process in the differenced error
term both for AB and BB estimation.
The fitted values of the models estimated above are presented in Figures 2.1 to 2.4. So
far we know that if outcome variable of interest follows a random walk-like process, BB
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would perform better. That might be one reason for the better fit of the model, and higher
prediction power that we can observe in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.1: Log GDP Vs. FE Model Fitted Values
Figure 2.2: Log GDP Growth Vs. FD Model Fitted Values
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Figure 2.3: Log GDP Vs. AB Model Fitted Values
Figure 2.4: Log GDP Vs. BB Model Fitted Values
The estimation results in Table 2.2 raise a cautionary flag: the estimate of ρ, which is
the slope of the lagged dependent variable, is close to 1 in every regression. This suggests
that the dependent variable (log GDP) may well have a unit root. In the next subsection,
we examine the issue of unit roots and co-integration in relation to these data.
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2.3.5 Unit Root and Co-integration Tests
A. Unit root tests
We consider a panel-data model with a first-order auto-regressive component for our
series:
yit = ρiyit−1
′ + Zit
′γi + εit (2.32)
where i indexes the units; t = 1, ..., T indexes the time; yit is the variable being tested for
unit root; γi is a vector of coefficients on Zit; the deterministic terms that control for panel-
specific effects and linear time trends. Dependent on the test and specifications, Z ′it can be
= (1, t) where Zit
′γi will provide the unit fixed effects, unit specific linear time trends. εit
is the error term. The test of the unit-root is to test the null hypothesis H0 : ρi = 1 for all
units i against the alternative Ha : ρi < 1. In some tests, the alternative may hold for one
unit, for some it holds for a fraction of all units or all.
One of the key differences between different unit root tests is how they treat the auto-
regressivee parameter ρi. Out of the 6 unit root tests available, the Levin-Lin-Chu test
(Levin et al., 2002) , Harris-Tsavalis test (Harris and Tzavalis, 1999) , and Breitung test
(Breitung, 2001, Breitung and Das, 2005) assume that all the units share the same auto-
regressive parameter meaning ρi = ρ for all i. However, if as an example, the variable
being tested is economic growth rate, and we are testing whether economic growth rates of
countries converges to a long run value, this restrictive assumption implies that the rate of
convergence would be the same for all the countries (Maddala and Wu, 1999).
Another key difference is whether these tests assume N or T is fixed, and if not at what
rate they tend to infinity. Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) provide an overview of these as-
sumption and compare the performance of these test using Monte Carlo simulation. Another
difference across these test is whether they perform with balanced or unbalanced data. The
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first three tests mentioned above only perform with the balanced data. The Im-Pesaran-Shin
test (Im et al., 2003) assumes T and N are fixed or N can be infinite, assumes auto-regressive
parameter is unit specific, and it performs well with unbalanced data. The Fisher type test
(Choi, 2001) assumes T is not finite and N can be both finite and infinite. The test assumes
unit specific auto-regressive parameter and it performs well with unbalanced data. The last
test, Hadri LM test (Hadri, 2000) also assumes infinite T and N and it requires balanced
data. The most appropriate test for our case of study seems to be the Im-Pesaran-Shin test.
However, we also provide the result of Fisher type test in Table 2.3 below. The Hardi LM
test is not feasible due to the missing values (the test requires strongly balanced data). We
also will not consider the first three tests due to the reasons mentioned above. The series
included in the tests are: log GDP, log population, trade, natural rents, and agriculture. As
we can see in this table, log GDP and trade are two series that follow a unit root process.
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Table 2.3: Unit Root Tests Results
Tests
The Im-Pesaran-Shin Test:
P-value
Log GDP 1.0000
Log population 0.0009
Total natural rent(% of GDP) 0.0000
Trade(% of GDP) 0.2407
Agriculture(% of GDP) 0.0000
The Fisher Type Test:
Log GDP 1.0000
Log population 0.0000
Total natural rent(% of GDP) 0.0319
Trade(% of GDP) 0.2359
Agriculture(% of GDP) 0.0003
Note: For the Im-Pesaran-Shin Test: H0: All panels contain unit roots and Ha: Some panels are
stationary. For the Fisher type test we have H0: All panels contain unit roots and Ha: At least
one panel is stationary.
B. Co-integration tests
A non-stationary process wanders over time because it has time-varying first two moments
(mean, variance, or both). Our variables are integrated of order one, meaning that we have
stationary first-differences processes (I(1)), and we want to check if the linear combination
of our several I(1) series is stationary and the series are co-integrated (Engle and Granger,
1987). If we find from our test that our series are co-integrated, it means in long run, they
move together although they can each wander arbitrarily.
The panel data model considered for all the co-integration tests is as follow and for this
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section we stick to the same notation:
yit = Xit
′βi + Zit
′γi + eit (2.33)
For each unit i the predictors Xit is considered to be an I(1) process. βi denotes the
co-integrating vector, which may vary across units. γi is a vector of coefficients on Zit, the
deterministic terms that control for panel-specific effects and linear time trends. Dependent
on the test and specifications, Z ′it can be = (1, t) where Zit
′γi will provide the unit fixed
effects, unit specific linear time trends. eit is the error term.
The common null hypothesis in the tests is that the dependent variable and predictors
are not co-integrated. The tests check the co-integration by testing if eit is non-stationary.
If the null of non-stationary error term is rejected, it means Yit and Xit are co-integrated.
We will provide the result of three co-integration tests: The Kao test, the Pedroni test,
and the Westerlund test. The different DF statistics that are reported by the first two tests
use different regression frameworks to incorporate the serial correlation in eit. The VA test
reported by the latter two, do not require any accommodations for serial correlation. All
different Dicky Fuller t test statistics that are reported with these tests are constructed by
fitting a version of the model (2.33) using ordinary least squares, obtaining the predicted
residuals, and then fitting the DF regression model:
êit = ρêi,t−1 + νit (2.34)
where ρ is the AR parameter and νit is a stationary error term. The DF t and un-adjusted
DF t check if ρ = 1. On the other hand, the Modified DF t and un-adjusted Modified DF
t check if ρ − 1 = 0, and non-stationarity under the null hypothesis causes these two to be
different.
For the PP t statistic reported by Pedroni test, first we fit the model (2.33) using ordinary
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least square, and then we fit the DF regression model below which is slightly different than
above:
êit = ρiêi,t−1 + νit (2.35)
In this model, we have unit specific ρ, and a PP t tests if ρi = 1, and a modified pp t
tests if ρi − 1 = 0.
The Augmented DF t uses additional lags of the error terms to incorporate serial corre-
lation. We still check if ρ = 1 but the ADF regression model is :
êit = ρiêi,t−1 +
p∑
j=1
ρij∆êi,t−1 + ν
∗
it. (2.36)
where ∆êi,t−1 is the j
th lag of the first difference of êit and j = 1, ..., p where p is the
number of lag differences.
To be more clear, the Kao test assumes βi = β meaning that there is a co-integration
vector that is the same across all the units, and there is a unit fixed effect and no linear time
trend (Zit = (1, 0)). As mentioned above, the null hypothesis of the Kao test is that there is
no co-integration among the series. So, the co-integration relationship is :
yit = Xit
′β + γi + eit (2.37)
The tests derived by Pedroni on the other hand, allow for unit-specific co-integrating
vectors βi. Also the DF regression model incorporates heterogeneous unit-specific AR coef-
ficients (ρi), although the tests allows to restrict the AR coefficient to be the same across
units. Considering a linear time trend is also possible with this test. Same as the Kao test,
the null hypothesis is no co-integration between dependent variable and covariates.
In the Westerlund tests similar to Pedroni’s tests, the AR parameter is considered to be
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unit-specific (ρi). In contrast to the Kao and Pedroni tests that check the null hypothesis
against an alternative of “all series are co-integrated”, this test checks the null against
the alternative that some of the series are co-integrated. However, the test allows for the
alternative of “all series are co-integrated” under the restriction ρi = ρ. So the Westerlund
derived two Variance Ratio statistics one for unit-specific AR parameter and one for same
AR parameter across all units.
CHAPTER 2. 56
Table 2.4: Co-integration Tests Results
Statistics p-value
Kao Tests:
Modified Dickey-Fuller t 2.8071 0.0025
Dickey-Fuller t 3.0129 0.0013
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t 3.2682 0.0005
Unadjusted modified Dickey-Fuller t 2.5224 0.0058
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t 2.4996 0.0062
Pedroni Tests (Same AR Parameter):
Modified variance ratio -3.8702 0.0001
Modified Phillips-Perron t 1.6607 0.0484
Phillips-Perron t 2.0511 0.0201
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t 1.8093 0.0352
Westerlund Tests (Against All Panels):
Variance ratio -2.5285 0.0057
Westerlund Tests (Against Some Panels):
Variance ratio -2.5644 0.0052
Table 2.4 above provides the result of the co-integration tests. The series included in the
tests are: log GDP and trade, the two non-stationary series in our analysis. As we can see
in the table, all test statistics reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration in favor of the
alternative hypothesis of the existence of a co-integrating relation among the series.
In principle, regression based on non-stationary panel variables may prove spurious as
in the case of time-series. However Kao (1999) showed that estimates of the structural
parameter binding two independent non-stationary variables converges to zero in the case
of panel data, whereas in the case of time series it is a random variable. This means that
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although non-stationary panel data may lead to biased standard errors, the point estimations
of the value of parameters are consistent. We also have co-integrated series in our data so
the previous results in Table 2.2 will hold. However, we will provide the same panel data
analysis for the growth of GDP as well; in this analysis we also consider growth of trade as
a predictor instead of levels.
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Table 2.5: Dynamic Panel Data Model Estimation Result
(FE) (FD) (AB) (AB) (BB) (BB)
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth
Iran 2012 -12.13*** -6.615*** -12.41*** -10.89*** -11.16*** -9.98***
( 2.211) ( 1.94) ( 0.986) (0.217) (0.994) (0.364)
Iran 2013 -2.93 0.60 -3.94*** -2.18*** -0.561 0.905
( 4.891) (3.757) (1.35) (0.633) (1.375) (1.085)
Iran 2014 0.27 4.72** -0.348 1.027*** 2.054*** 2.87***
(2.339) ( 2.289) (1.188) (0.282) (0.579) (0.294)
L.Growth 0.198 -0.065 0.12*** 0.156*** 0.295*** 0.383***
(0.304) (0.216) (0.036) (0.0334) (0.104) (0.098)
Pop Growth 0.375* 0.629 0.417 0.216 0.269 0.354*
(0.205) (0.552) (0.315) (0.036) (0.241) (0.197)
Rents 2.571 15.929** 4.89** 12.1*** -4.197** 1.888
( 4.554) ( 7.886) (1.96) (2.37) (2.035) (2.033)
Trade Growth -7.64 -14.39** -8.92 -2.94 -7.636** -0.086*
(9.261) ( 6.618) (5.60) (7.748) (5.809) (7.405)
Agriculture 20.39** -5.317 21.10** -1.71 7.705* 8.876*
(10.889) (19.95) (9.227) (4.319) (4.292) (4.669)
N 280 271 279 279 293 293
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
AB AR(2) (Pr > z) . . 0.455 0.303 0.234 0.147
Overid. (Pr > z) . . 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses.The dependent variable is GDP Annual Growth.
Variables in the FD model are first-differenced.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Same as Table 2.2, the first column provides the result of a Fixed Effect model, the
second column provides the result of the first difference model, and column 3 to 6 report the
result of the Arellano Bond and Blundell Bond models with and without time fixed effects.
The result of the table is in line with previous result we obtained earlier in this chapter.
As we can see the coefficient of the lagged term is not close to one. The effect of sanction
on Iran’s growth is reported to be from -6.6 to -12.41 percent for the first year. For 2013,
the coefficients are negative for most of the regressions. for 2014, all of the models report a
positive coefficient. The actual growth of is Iran is reported to suffer a -7.4 percent drop in
2012, followed by a -0.2 percent drop in 2013, and a change of a positive 4.6 percent for 2014.
According to all the regressions in the table except the first difference model, the negative
effect of sanctions is reported to be higher at least for the first year. The result of the AR
test does not show a dependency of the idiosyncratic error term to the lagged values of the
growth which are being used as instruments, and the result of the over-identification test
shows the in dependency of the instruments to the included predictors.
2.4 Conclusion
In comparative case studies we need similarities in the covariates between the treated unit
and the controls. The synthetic control method creates a control unit which resembles the
values of outcome variable as well as predictors almost perfectly. However, the product of the
method is a point estimate with no estimation of the underlying distribution. We compare
the result of the synthetic control method obtained in the first chapter with a traditional
regression framework. We compare the method with a Diff-in-Diff regression framework, as
well as a dynamic panel data analysis. We also show that the synthetic control method
provides an unbiased estimator if the outcome variable follows a dynamic panel data model.
Chapter 3
A Monte Carlo Analysis of
Robustness of Synthetic Control
Method and Dynamic Panel
Estimation
We design a Monte Carlo study to compare the methods we used in previous chapters more
in depth. We involve fewer donor countries in the Monte Carlo Analysis due to the missing
values of the predictors for a substantial period of time. We have Iran as the treated unit,
and the donor pool consists of Algeria, Ecuador, Saudi Arabia, China, Turkey, and Nigeria.
Similar to the first chapter, the empirical analysis is based on annual country level panel
data, but for the period 1990-2014.
The set up of the Monte Carlo study is as follows. We assume the dynamic panel data
model below
yit = ρyi,t−1 +X
′
itβ +D
′
itκ+ µi + νit (3.1)
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in which yit is the outcome variable (log GDP, as well as Growth) for country i at time t. xit
is the set of predictors, Dit is the set of three dummies which equal to one for Iran for 2012,
2013, and 2014. µis are countries fixed effects. We estimate the model above for the new
donor pool. An estimation of the equation (3.1) provides ρ̂ = 1.0054, β̂agriculture = 0.062,
β̂trade = 0.0136, β̂rents = −0.00531, β̂population = −0.000139, κ̂2012 = −0.114, κ̂2013 = −0.0662,
κ̂2014 = −0.0037, and σ̂ν = 0.0529. We calculate
µ̂i = yi − ρ̂yi,−1 −X
′
iβ̂ +D
′
iκ̂ (3.2)
and we use Xit the set of predictors we have in the actual data set for i = 1, ..., 7 and
t = 1, ..., T . We have µ̂µ = 0.0155, σ̂µ = 0.0136 as the mean and standard deviation of the
seven values of the µ̂i calculated from equation (3.2). For the Monte Carlo replications, we
draw µi from N(µ̂µ, σ̂
2
µ) where the mean and standard error are calculated from equation
(3.2). Moreover, for each replication we draw νit from N(0, σ̂
2
ν) where the standard error is
estimated from equation (3.1).
We generate the outcome variable using all the information put together. For yi0 we
use actual values of the outcome variable for the first period of the analysis. Then, for
i = 1, ..., 7 and t = 1, ..., T , we generate a Monte Carlo value for the outcome variable for
each replication using ρ̂, β̂,κ̂, σ̂ν , µi, and νit using equation (3.3) below:
yit,MC = ρ̂yi,t−1,MC +X
′
itβ̂ +D
′
itκ̂+ µi + νit (3.3)
Now using the Monte Carlo values for the outcome variable we estimate different models
and compare the methods we discussed in previous chapter. We estimate a dynamic panel
data model using Blundell Bond method (as it was the best approach in chapter 2). We also
use the Monte Carlo values and run a synthetic control analysis.
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We also do the same analysis with Growth instead of GDP. We use the Blundell Bond
estimation result for growth as well. The list of the parameters included for growth is as
follow: ρ̂ = 0.38, β̂agriculture = 8.88, β̂tradegrowth = −0.086, β̂rents = 1.89, β̂populationgrowth =
0.354, κ̂2012 = −9.98, κ̂2013 = 0.090, κ̂2014 = 2.912, µ̂µ = −3.23, σ̂µ = 2.03, and σ̂ν = 5.52.
As discussed earlier, the caveat of the synthetic control method is that it only gives
us one point estimate of the effect of the intervention. The method does not provide any
assumption for the underlying distribution of the estimator; there is no estimation of the
standard error, and the method lacks any significance analysis. We want to use the benefit
of the replication with the Monte Carlo study to explore more.
In the previous chapter, we provided an “unbiasedness” analysis showing that if the out-
come variable of interest follows a dynamic panel data model the synthetic control estimator
is an unbiased estimator. With the Monte Carlo analysis, the goal in this chapter is to see
how well the method would perform if we replicate the intervention. The goal is to estimate
a standard error of the estimation, and also check the robustness of the methods.
On the other hand, we picked a dynamic panel model to represent a traditional regression
framework. This model seems to be appropriate in comparison with the synthetic control
method, because usually the synthetic control method is used to study an aggregate level
effect of a policy intervention on macro variables. So with the Monte Carlo study, we also
examine the performance of the panel data model. One of the most important assumptions
of this model is the orthogonality of the units fixed effects and the idiosyncratic error term.
If this assumption or any of the assumptions of the dynamic panel model does not hold, we
would observe a distance between what we set to be the “true” coefficients and the ones
we will get from the Monte Carlo replications. The result of the Monte Carlo analysis is
provided in Table 3.1.
CHAPTER 3. 63
Table 3.1: Monte Carlo Analysis, 100 Replications
a. DPD With Log GDP:
Coefficient SE Total Effect SE
Iran 2012 -0.117** 0.054 -0.117 0.054
Iran 2013 -0.071* 0.056 -0.191 0.075
Iran 2014 0.002 0.054 -0.187 0.097
b. SCM With Log GDP:
Gaps SE
Iran 2012 -0.109 0.231
Iran 2013 -0.196 0.229
Iran 2014 -0.203 0.238
RMSPE SE
0.095 0.047
c. DPD With GDP Growth:
Coefficient SE Total Effect SE
Iran 2012 -13.670 ** 6.198 -13.670 6.198
Iran 2013 1.764 6.007 -5.203 7.068
Iran 2014 1.677 4.925 -0.999 6.428
d. SCM With GDP Growth:
Gaps SE
Iran 2012 -13.004 8.205
Iran 2013 -4.516 8.639
Iran 2014 0.473 6.393
RMSPE SE
5.730 0.994
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
SMC stands for the Synthetic Control Method and DPD stands for the Dynamic Panel Data model.
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The result of the 100 replications for the dynamic panel data models is as follow:

∆LGDP2012 =
1
100
∑100
r=1 κ̂2012r = −0.117
∆LGDP2013 =
1
100
∑100
r=1[κ̂2013r + ρ̂r ∗ κ̂2012r] = −0.196
∆LGDP2014 =
1
100
∑100
r=1[κ̂2014r + ρ̂r ∗ κ̂2013r] = −0.188.
Following the same calculation for growth we have:

∆Growth2012 = −13.67
∆Growth2013 = −5.203
∆Growth2014 = −0.999.
For the synthetic control method :

∆LGDP2012 = −0.109
∆LGDP2013 = −0.196
∆LGDP2014 = −0.203.

∆Growth2012 = −13.04
∆Growth2013 = −4.516
∆Growth2014 = 0.473.
As mentioned in previous chapters, by solving an optimization problem to minimize
RMSPE, synthetic control suffers from lack of providing a distribution for the estimates and
any standard error estimation. As we expected, the point estimates of the Synthetic Control
method over many replications are in line with the true estimates. However there is a large
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variation in the point estimates over replications and we obtain large standard errors. In
other word, in contrast to the dynamic panel data method, the coefficients provided by the
Synthetic Control method are insignificant.
A second conclusion suggested by the result in Table 3.1 is the following. The standard
errors of the synthetic control estimates are more in line with those of the dynamic panel data
estimation when the dependent variable is GDP growth than when the dependent variable
is log GDP. Tentatively, we conclude that synthetic control estimates are much less robust
when the variable under study contains a unit root. We leave it for a future study to explore
this in greater detail.
3.1 Sensitivity Analysis
3.1.1 Before and After the Intervention, RMSPE Analysis
The result provided in the previous section mainly refers to the post intervention period.
We can also study the synthetic control method for pre-intervention period by analyzing the
RMSPE as well as the dynamic of the donor pool. The RMSPE for Iran over 100 replications
is 0.095. We explain below how we study this number.
In chapter 1 we provided a “In space” placebo study in which we assigned the sanctions to
one of the donor countries iteratively and compare the gap plot of Iran with the ones driven
from this exercise. RMSPE represents how well fitted the synthetic control method is able
to produce a control unit. The goal of this exercise was to provide a placebo distribution
for the estimator, and to confirm that the estimated effect of intervention for Iran is an
outlier in the placebo distribution for countries with or without well-fitted synthetic control
unit. Here, with having the benefit of replication, we repeat this placebo assignment. We
iteratively assign the treatment to one of the donor countries, and we run the synthetic
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control method with 100 replications. We preserve RMSPE for each of the 7 countries.
Figure 3.1 to 3.7 below provide a density function for the RMSPE for the countries in the
pool; Figure 3.3 refers to Iran. For Ecuador and China, the range of the error is larger than
all other five countries; for these countries finding a synthetic control as a weighted average of
other donors is difficult. The reason is that China has the largest economy in terms of gross
domestic product among all the donors, and Ecuador has the smallest. Synthetic control
is constructed as the weighted average of the donors with weights between zero and one.
Therefore, the construction of the synthetic control unit from the donors is not plausible.
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Figure 3.1: Density Function of the RMSPE for Algeria, 100 Replications.
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Figure 3.2: Density Function of the RMSPE for Ecuador, 100 Replications.
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Figure 3.3: Density Function of the RMSPE for Iran, 100 Replications.
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Figure 3.4: Density Function of the RMSPE for Nigeria, 100 Replications.
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Figure 3.5: Density Function of the RMSPE for Saudi Arabia, 100 Replications.
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Figure 3.6: Density Function of the RMSPE for China, 100 Replications.
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Figure 3.7: Density Function of the RMSPE for Turkey, 100 Replications.
Over 100 replications, the density function of the Iran’s RMSPE seems to be similar to
those of the other four countries: Algeria, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. For Ecuador
and China, the synthetic control is not performing well and we observe larger values of
RMSPE over 100 replications.
We remove the two countries with less fitted synthetic control unit (Ecuador and China).
We provide the density function of the RMSPE of all the donors combined (excluding Iran)
in Figure 3.8 below. Note that Iran’s value of the predicted error is 0.09. This value is not an
outlier in the distribution which 5 donor countries over 100 repeated trials. This means that
the synthetic control method is working well for all the remaining donors, and is providing
a well fitted synthetic control for the pre-intervention period. Therefore, the analysis of
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the post-intervention effects which we will provide in the next section is reasonable. In
the next section, we compare the placebo intervention effects for the donor countries, and
this comparison only would be logical if we have well fitted synthetic control units for pre-
intervention period.
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Figure 3.8: Density Function of the RMSPE - All Donors Combined, 100 Replications.
3.1.2 Before and After the Intervention, Density Functions of the
Placebo Effects
We already observed large variation in the annual effects that are reported in Table 3.1
by the synthetic control method. However, we expand the placebo studies and we look at
the reported placebo effects of sanction for all the donor countries. Figure 3.9 provides the
density function of the estimated placebo effects of the donor countries for year 2012. Each
donor is treated for 100 replications. Figure 3.10 provides the same information for year
2013, and Figure 3.11 provides the information for year 2014.
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Figure 3.9: Density Function of the Estimated Placebo Effects - All Donors, Year 2012.
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Figure 3.10: Density Function of the Estimated Placebo Effects - All Donors, Year 2013.
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Figure 3.11: Density Function of the Estimated Placebo Effects - All Donors, Year 2014.
Iran’s cumulative effect of sanction on log GDP, predicted by the synthetic control anal-
ysis over 100 replications is estimated to be -0.109 for 2012, followed by an estimate of
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-0.196 for 2013 and -0.203 for 2014 according to Table 3.1. The critical values of the density
function for α = 0.05 for 2012, 2013, and 2014 are -0.339, -0.414, and -0.445. Therefore,
in comparison to the distribution of the placebo effect in Figure 3.9, 3.10, and3.11, Iran’s
effect is not statistically significant. We should note that as we move to the last year of the
analysis, 2014, the cumulative effect of sanction on Iran becomes more widely spread out
around the center of the distribution of the placebo effects as seen in Figure 3.11. Also, all
the distribution of the placebo effects for 2012, 2013, and 2014 are centered around zero; this
shows the method correctly does not report any effect on average for the donor countries.
3.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis, Assignment of the Intervention
In this exercise, we iteratively start by changing the assignment of Iran’s sanctions to one
of the donor countries. So, in the Monte Carlo we assign the intervention to one of the
donor countries in the data generating process, and we estimate a placebo sanction for that
donor country. In another trial, we do not assign any treatment to the country in the data
generating process, but we treat the unit to be intervened upon and we look at the reported
effect of the sanctions. Table 3.2 summarizes the result of this exercise. Each number is
driven from 100 Monte Carlo replications. For Algeria, one time we assign Iran’s sanctions in
the data generating process, we estimate the effect of the assigned sanctions on this country,
and one time we do not assign any treatment and we will look at the reported effect if
any. For 2012 and for Algeria when assigned the sanction, the dynamic panel data reports
significant coefficients similar to those of Iran, and when there is no assigned sanctions, the
method reports almost 0 as the effect of sanctions. The synthetic control method on the
other hand, reports smaller effect for 2012 when there is no assigned sanctions in the data
generating process, and reports larger numbers when the country is assigned to the sanctions.
Note that the RMSPE which refers to pre-sanction disparity between the synthetic unit and
actual unit is the same number for both cases for all the countries.
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The result of this exercise for all the countries in the donor pool is similar to Algeria.
the dynamic panel data reports significant and very similar numbers for Ecuador, Nigeria,
Saudi Arabia, China, and Turkey as the effect of the sanctions, when actually we assign the
sanctions to them in the data generating process, while the method reports almost 0 for all
countries as the effect of the sanctions when no sanctions had been assigned to the country
in the data generating process. However, there is a large variation in the result reported by
the synthetic control method.
Table 3.2: Sensitivity Analysis, Varying the Intervention Unit
DPD Synthetic Control——————————— ———————————2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 RMSPE
Algeria no treatment 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 0.022 0.017 0.014 0.121
0.053 0.077 0.099 0.169 0.188 0.215 0.063
Algeria treated -0.113 -0.182 -0.193 -0.093 -0.164 -0.171 0.121
0.053 0.077 0.099 0.169 0.188 0.215 0.063
Ecuador no treatment 0.003 0.199 0.200 -1.301 -1.299 -1.301 1.245
0.056 0.080 0.095 0.542 0.561 0.590 0.277
Ecuador treated -0.111 -0.168 -0.172 -1.416 -1.480 -1.486 1.245
0.056 0.080 0.095 0.542 0.561 0.590 0.277
Nigeria no treatment 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.064 0.072 0.077 0.142
0.062 0.078 0.102 0.157 0.180 0.195 0.082
Nigeria treated -0.114 -0.176 -0.185 -0.051 -0.109 -0.109 0.142
0.062 0.078 0.102 0.157 0.180 0.195 0.082
SA no treatment -0.009 -0.011 -0.021 -0.028 -0.028 -0.044 0.144
0.056 0.082 0.100 0.185 0.211 0.235 0.064
SA treated -0.123 -0.192 -0.207 -0.142 -0.210 -0.230 0.144
0.056 0.082 0.100 0.185 0.211 0.235 0.064
China no treatment -0.003 0.004 0.004 1.084 1.093 1.088 1.099
0.050 0.082 0.099 0.532 0.549 0.574 0.248
China treated -0.117 -0.177 -0.182 0.970 0.912 0.903 1.099
0.050 0.082 0.099 0.532 0.549 0.574 0.248
Turkey no treatment 0.000 -0.001 -0.008 0.007 0.004 -0.006 0.113
0.062 0.096 0.113 0.168 0.187 0.205 0.054
Turkey treated -0.115 -0.182 -0.194 -0.107 -0.177 -0.192 0.113
0.062 0.096 0.113 0.168 0.187 0.205 0.054
Each value are averaged for 100 trials.
The second number below each coefficient is the standard error over 100 replications.
The first three columns report the result of the dynamic panel data regression.
The second three columns report the synthetic control method result.
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3.1.4 Sensitivity Analysis, Donor Pool Size
We reduced the donor pool size from 13 units to 7 (including Iran) to have a precise Monte
Carlo analysis and reduce the issue with missing values. This reduction had an insubstantial
effect on the estimated values. Here, we want to study the sensitivity of our methods to
the sample size (donor pool size in case of the synthetic control). The first row of Table
3.3 provides another round of 100 replications with all the donor countries same as previous
trial reported in Table 3.1. We also report the average of the weights on each donor in this
table (W1 to W7). As we can see the sum of the weights are equal to one. In the first row
the RMSPE is 0.095.
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of the methods to the sample size and the dynamic
of the donor pool, we remove one of the donors one by one and we rerun the Monte Carlo
study. The result is reported in the second to seventh row of Table 3.3. As we can see, the
result of the dynamic panel data is almost exactly the same as the one with all the donors
included. The synthetic control methods reports similar result but with a larger variation.
Also, the prediction error of the synthetic control increases by reducing one donor.
We extend this exercise more by removing 2 donors from the donor pool. Following rows
of Table 3.3 reports the result of this exercise with all possible combinations of the donor.
As we can see the dynamic panel data, with fewer number of observations still reports the
same coefficients and is insensitive to the removal of 2 donors.
We reduce the sample size and finally we only keep 2 units in the donor pool. The result
of the methods with only 2 donors is reported in the last row. This gives the dynamic panel
data model 24 years of data for only 3 units (including Iran) for each iteration. But still the
model is showing insensitivity to the small sample size. However, the average of the RMSPE
of the synthetic control method over the 100 replications is very large.
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Table 3.3: Sensitivity Analysis, Donor Pool Size
DPD Synthetic Control
—————————— ——————————
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 RMSPE W1 W2 W4 W5 W6 W7 Total W
-0.118 -0.191 -0.187 -0.151 -0.229 -0.223 0.124 0.087 0.064 0.064 0.238 0.222 0.326 1.000
SE 0.054 0.075 0.097 0.160 0.183 0.204 0.069 0.175 0.112 0.152 0.164 0.137 0.270
-0.118 -0.190 -0.187 -0.137 -0.215 -0.204 0.143 0.082 0.065 0.274 0.182 0.398 1.000
SE 0.054 0.075 0.097 0.149 0.171 0.189 0.094 0.108 0.122 0.143 0.149 0.242
-0.117 -0.188 -0.066 -0.142 -0.219 -0.208 0.131 0.138 0.052 0.258 0.135 0.416 1.000
SE 0.055 0.078 0.074 0.180 0.200 0.215 0.070 0.175 0.096 0.146 0.116 0.227
-0.117 -0.188 -0.183 -0.117 -0.193 -0.184 0.143 0.100 0.091 0.486 0.232 0.091 1.000
SE 0.055 0.076 0.099 0.183 0.198 0.224 0.073 0.168 0.106 0.066 0.067 0.102
-0.119 -0.194 -0.192 -0.146 -0.221 -0.214 0.141 0.155 0.039 0.090 0.225 0.491 1.000
SE 0.054 0.076 0.098 0.187 0.209 0.226 0.075 0.174 0.100 0.151 0.157 0.310
-0.117 -0.190 -0.185 -0.087 -0.161 -0.152 0.157 0.033 0.016 0.033 0.363 0.555 1.000
SE 0.054 0.077 0.098 0.244 0.263 0.274 0.078 0.102 0.040 0.068 0.289 0.291
-0.117 -0.189 -0.184 -0.130 -0.210 -0.203 0.143 0.156 0.124 0.080 0.274 0.366 1.000
SE 0.054 0.075 0.098 0.187 0.205 0.232 0.073 0.221 0.129 0.167 0.160 0.114
-0.116 -0.187 -0.065 -0.201 -0.277 -0.266 0.153 0.058 0.322 0.099 0.521 1.000
SE 0.055 0.079 0.074 0.236 0.256 0.269 0.076 0.122 0.150 0.092 0.221
-0.117 -0.188 -0.183 -0.081 -0.157 -0.150 0.183 0.156 0.486 0.233 0.125 1.000
SE 0.055 0.075 0.099 0.178 0.193 0.216 0.096 0.116 0.075 0.080 0.129
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2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 RMSPE W1 W2 W4 W5 W6 W7 Total W
-0.119 -0.193 -0.191 -0.103 -0.178 -0.171 0.187 0.067 0.029 0.089 0.815 1.000
SE 0.054 0.076 0.097 0.301 0.324 0.336 0.107 0.096 0.069 0.077 0.145
-0.117 -0.189 -0.185 -0.051 -0.125 -0.116 0.188 0.039 0.060 0.349 0.552 1.000
SE 0.054 0.076 0.0980 0.235 0.253 0.263 0.120 0.081 0.120 0.218 0.224
-0.117 -0.189 -0.184 -0.106 -0.185 -0.178 0.191 0.226 0.061 0.313 0.399 1.000
SE 0.054 0.075 0.098 0.179 0.199 0.225 0.104 0.119 0.117 0.132 0.103
-0.115 -0.185 -0.177 -0.147 -0.226 -0.217 0.140 0.231 0.340 0.162 0.267 1.000
SE 0.056 0.078 0.102 0.211 0.227 0.248 0.069 0.200 0.145 0.106 0.227
-0.119 -0.193 -0.190 -0.118 -0.194 -0.188 0.176 0.166 0.021 0.077 0.736 1.000
SE 0.055 0.079 0.099 0.275 0.295 0.310 0.087 0.176 0.052 0.086 0.229
-0.116 -0.186 -0.180 -0.089 -0.164 -0.155 0.174 0.065 0.053 0.313 0.570 1.000
SE 0.055 0.050 0.050 0.275 0.295 0.310 0.087 0.176 0.052 0.086 0.229
-0.116 -0.186 -0.179 -0.123 -0.200 -0.193 0.176 0.397 0.065 0.242 0.296 1.000
SE 0.055 0.077 0.099 0.240 0.256 0.275 0.099 0.203 0.152 0.157 0.107
-0.118 -0.192 -0.189 0.304 0.231 0.239 0.530 0.768 0.006 0.158 0.068 1.000
SE 0.055 0.077 0.100 0.448 0.458 0.482 0.291 0.203 0.040 0.132 0.151
-0.117 -0.187 -0.181 -0.001 -0.075 -0.065 0.200 0.083 0.023 0.432 0.461 1.000
SE 0.055 0.077 0.0981 0.261 0.273 0.286 0.099 0.131 0.064 0.082 0.105
-0.116 -0.185 -0.178 -0.103 -0.178 -0.168 0.153 0.138 0.102 0.490 0.269 1.000
SE 0.054 0.075 0.100 0.216 0.226 0.253 0.078 0.175 0.112 0.077 0.065
-0.118 -0.192 -0.189 -0.009 -0.085 -0.078 0.241 0.074 0.014 0.106 0.805 1.000
SE 0.054 0.078 0.101 0.317 0.338 0.350 0.132 0.122 0.056 0.156 0.203
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2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 RMSPE W1 W2 W4 W5 W6 W7 Total W
-0.118 -0.192 -0.189 -0.117 -0.195 -0.190 0.187 0.306 0.127 0.110 0.457 1.000
SE 0.054 0.076 0.0981 0.208 0.224 0.249 0.093 0.244 0.160 0.173 0.135
-0.116 -0.187 -0.182 0.085 0.006 0.016 0.372 0.179 0.007 0.288 0.525 1.000
SE 0.054 0.075 0.098 0.333 0.340 0.367 0.178 0.242 0.037 0.256 0.295
-0.113 -0.179 -0.166 -0.243 -0.320 -0.310 0.159 0.324 0.091 0.585 1.000
SE 0.058 0.083 0.107 0.293 0.316 0.324 0.102 0.184 0.098 0.223
-0.116 -0.188 -0.181 -0.149 -0.226 -0.218 0.216 0.070 0.026 0.903 1.000
SE 0.055 0.079 0.099 0.415 0.441 0.452 0.131 0.105 0.058 0.111
-0.114 -0.183 -0.173 -0.118 -0.194 -0.186 0.170 0.111 0.335 0.554 1.000
SE 0.055 0.078 0.099 0.301 0.320 0.333 0.080 0.169 0.276 0.280
-0.115 -0.184 -0.174 -0.489 -0.567 -0.561 0.381 0.108 0.573 0.319 1.000
SE 0.055 0.078 0.099 0.505 0.512 0.528 0.250 0.149 0.139 0.116
-0.114 -0.181 -0.172 0.733 0.665 0.676 0.923 1.000 0.000 1.000
SE 0.054 0.079 0.102 0.545 0.562 0.583 0.247 0.000 0.000
Numbers are averaged for 100 replications. W1 to W7 are the weights on the donor countries; note that country 3 is the treated unit (“Iran”).
If no weight is reported that unit is left out of the analysis.
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3.2 Conclusion
In this chapter we discuss the performance of the methods we used in previous chapters over
many replications. We use a Monte Carlo generated values of GDP and we run a synthetic
control method, and estimate a dynamic panel data model over repeated trials. We showed
in chapter 2, the synthetic control estimator can be an unbiased estimator if the underlying
model of the outcome variable of interest is a dynamic panel data. In this chapter, we
examine the robustness of the method. We conclude that the dynamic panel data model
seems to be performing well with the macro level aggregate data, and the assumptions are
appropriate. However, for the synthetic control method we observe large standard error in
the estimated values. If we translate that to a significance analysis, this means that even
though we observe meaningful values reported as the effect of the intervention, they are not
statistically significant.
Appendix
The data source employed for the analysis are as follow:
• Gross Domestic Production (PPP, Constant 2011 international dollars). Source: World
Bank, International Comparison Program Database, WEI, 2017. Second source : IMF,
World Economic Outlook Databases (WEO) 2017.
• Gross Domestic Production per Capita (PPP, Constant 2011 international dollars).
Source: World Bank, International Comparison Program Database, WEI, 2017. Sec-
ond source : IMF, World Economic Outlook Databases (WEO) 2017.
• Gross Domestic Production Growth (Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market
prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S.
dollars). Source: World Bank, International Comparison Program Database, WEI,
2017.
• GDP Deflator (100 in 2011). Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, WEI, 2017.
Second source : IMF, World Economic Outlook Databases (WEO) 2017.
• PPP Conversion Factor, GDP (LCU per international dollar). Source: World Bank,
International Comparison Program Database, WEI, 2017.
• Total Population. Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2017.
78
APPENDIX 79
• Total Natural Resources Rents (Percentage of GDP). Source: World Bank National
Accounts Data, WEI, 2017.
• Agriculture, Value Added (Percentage of GDP). Source: World Bank National Ac-
counts Data, WEI, 2017.
• Services, etc., Value Added (Percentage of GDP). Source: World Bank National Ac-
counts Data, WEI, 2017.
• Industry, Value Added (Percentage of GDP). Source: World Bank National Accounts
Data, WEI, 2017.
Table A.1 to A.15 provide descriptive statistics:
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Year overall 1997 10.11 1980 2014 N = 490
between 0 1997 1997 n = 14
within 10.11 1980 2014 T = 35
ID overall 7.5 4.04 1 14 N = 490
between 4.18 1 14 n = 14
within 0 7.5 7.5 T = 35
GDP overall 764.32 1894.69 0 17406.24 N = 485
between 1400.46 30.15 5478.43 n = 14
within 1321.82 -4009.17 12692.13 T-bar = 34.64
Population overall 1.11e+08 3.08e+08 223715 1.36e+09 N = 487
between 3.17e+08 720039.6 1.21e+09 n = 14
within 3.29e+07 -1.12e+08 2.71e+08 T-bar = 34.7857
Rents overall 19.85 15.49 0.12 66.48 N = 477
between 13.67 0.56 38.81 n = 14
within 8.35 -11.77 57.45 T-bar = 34.0714
Trade overall 72.37 38.40 12.42 251.14 N = 441
between 36.86 37.12 160.44 n = 14
within 16.39 25.16 163.06 T-bar = 31.5
Industry overall 46.73 24.08 23.82 213.69 N = 304
between 25.41 29.39 122.29 n = 13
within 13.06 -5.804 138.13 T-bar = 23.38
Agriculture overall 11.76 10.47 0.09 48.57 N = 324
between 9.65 0.17 33.04 n = 14
within 4.31 -1.05 27.28 T-bar = 23.14
Growth overall 4.15 7.11 -62.08 33.99 N = 442
between 3.13 -1.001 11.52 n = 14
within 6.66 -56.92 34.54 T-bar = 31.57
Services overall 43.31 11.33 19.49 71.31 N = 324
between 12.12 22.97 68.98 n = 14
within 6.32 25.31 68.47 T-bar = 23.14
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics, Algeria
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 328.99 96.06 200.80 527.36
Population 2.93e+07 5602000 1.93e+07 3.89e+07
Rents 14.98 6.68 4.52 27.12
Trade 57.24 10.93 32.68 76.68452
Industry 52.75 4.95 45.29 62.49
Agriculture 10.03 1.64 7.001 13.04
Growth 2.83 2.32 -2.10 7.20
Services 37.22 3.68 29.50 43.32
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics, Ecuador
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 98.96 32.30 60.68 173.71
Population 1.19e+07 2403122 7976449 1.59e+07
Rents 9.24 4.01 2.90 17.45
Trade 47.56 10.44 29.92 68.06
Industry 30.90 4.75 24.37 39.59
Agriculture 16.28 5.33 9.06 24.31
Growth 3.26 2.48 -4.74 8.21
Services 52.82 3.25 47.34 58.25
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Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics, Iran
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 810.17 291.89 432.96 1349.50
Population 6.13e+07 1.14e+07 3.87e+07 7.81e+07
Rents 19.77 8.03 2.73 34.86
Trade 39.47 10.26 14.14 56.05
Industry 38.56 6.23 25.39 46.91
Agriculture 10.44 3.12 5.47 16.82
Growth 2.42 7.70 -21.60 23.17
Services 50.26 4.11 44.70 58.87
Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics, Kuwait
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 254.14 18.05 225.47 267.92
Population 3413009 275485 3059473 3753121
Rents 56.20 5.17 48.40 60.83
Trade 98.96 1.66 97.03 101.01
Industry 66.02 3.23 61.05 69.08
Agriculture 0.38 0.05 0.33 0.42
Growth 3.11 4.89 -2.37 9.63
Services 33.56 3.17 30.58 38.54
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Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics, Nigeria
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 431.84 296.33 0 1000.87
Population 1.25e+08 2.81e+07 8.39e+07 1.77e+08
Rents 30.07 11.92 10.04 63.52
Trade 54.38 15.12 23.72 81.81
Industry 37.78 8.14 24.95 52.99
Agriculture 32.90 6.78 20.24 48.57
Growth 4.90 7.29 -10.75 33.74
Services 29.32 10.66 19.74 54.82
Table A.7: Descriptive Statistics, Saudi Arabia
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 841.30 293.51 489.63 1532.56
Population 2.02e+07 6083122 9912917 3.09e+07
Rents 35.15 11.81 17.40 64.25
Trade 75.60 11.20 56.47 96.10
Industry 53.27 8.87 37.82 71.49
Agriculture 4.05 1.73 .99 6.34
Growth 2.22 7.99 -20.73 17.01
Services 42.58 7.53 27.52 57.25
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Table A.8: Descriptive Statistics, UAE
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 460.40 77.69 331.57 579.97
Population 6330386 2317741 3217865 9086139
Rents 20.85 4.54 12.76 26.17
Trade 137.07 30.42 89.86 176.42
Agriculture 1.19 0.59 0.64 2.24
Growth 4.30 3.92 -5.24 9.84
Services 44.93 3.05 41.00 50.25
Table A.9: Descriptive Statistics, Qatar
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 165.13 82.54 66.66 286.97
Population 1328053 591055 613720 2172065
Rents 24.40 5.05 17.37 32.49
Trade 93.92 6.89 80.14 105.75
Industry 116.44 52.24 69.76 213.69
Agriculture 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.38
Growth 11.52 7.50 3.72 26.17
Services 37.64 10.47 26.44 59.82
.
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Table A.10: Descriptive Statistics, Libya
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 148.01 22.79 114.23 175.44
Population 5811463 218882 5518341 6123022
Rents 56.71 7.90 45.86 66.48
Trade 94.58 8.55 78.86 102.22
Industry 74.06 4.82 66.08 78.52
Agriculture 2.97 1.31 1.87 5.20
Growth 6.27 4.92 -0.96 13.02
Services 22.97 3.93 19.50 28.72
Table A.11: Descriptive Statistics, China
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 5478.43 4939.29 704.94 17406.24
Population 1.21e+09 1.19e+08 9.81e+08 1.36e+09
Rents 6.06 4.41 1.31 19.003
Trade 37.12 14.68 12.42 65.62
Industry 45.06 1.80 41.03 48.06
Agriculture 18.74 7.94 9.06 32.79
Growth 9.83 2.71 3.91 15.14
Services 36.20 7.37 22.31 47.84
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Table A.12: Descriptive Statistics, Bahrain
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 53.93 3.41 50.34 58.58
Population 1322453 40054.28 1261319 1361930
Rents 7.59 1.60 4.83 8.71
Trade 121.75 4.02 116.88 127.99
Industry 47.30 1.69 44.98 49.52
Agriculture 0.29 0.01 0.27 0.30
Growth 3.96 1.26 1.98 5.42
Services 51.81 1.85 49.41 54.25
Table A.13: Descriptive Statistics, Turkey
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 806.86 334.50 348.05 1472.39
Population 6.04e+07 9728130 4.39e+07 7.75e+07
Rents 0.56 .35 0.12 1.43
Trade 41.74 11.03 17.09 60.01
Industry 29.63 2.98 23.82 35.34
Agriculture 14.57 5.24 7.45 26.50
Growth 4.53 4.48 -5.96 11.11
Services 55.24 5.35 47.97 63.91
.
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Table A.14: Descriptive Statistics, Oman
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 125.33 56.20 26.03 159.56
Population 3210508 1212067 1154375 4236057
Rents 45.59 4.70 38.67 50.96
Trade 115.41 9.92 100.31 128.22
Industry 115.41 9.92 100.31 128.22
Agriculture 1.46 0.62 1.08 2.56
Growth 4.23 3.89 -1.11 9.33
Services 32.96 3.33 28.25 37.39
Table A.15: Descriptive Statistics, Canada
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 1406.84 51.18 1342.60 1488.33
Population 3.40e+07 812341.7 3.29e+07 3.52e+07
Rents 3.37 1.31 2.35 5.80
Trade 62.60 3.07 58.35 66.92
Industry 29.39 1.54 27.22 31.67
Agriculture 1.63 0.16 1.42 1.84
Growth 1.51 2.10 -2.95 3.14
Services 68.98 1.58 66.62 71.31
.
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